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I. Introduction 
A, The Probl•• 
The life of every person in the United States, 
whether engaged in business or the professions, whether 
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a politician, housewife, farmer or worker, is affected in 
some way by the existence and aoti vi ties of labor organiza-
tions. This will continue as long as we have a democratic 
form of government and a free enterprise economy, because 
organizations of workers are a natural concomitant of a 
competitive economy and are evidence of a free society. 
In 70 years American labor unions have grown from 
small unorganized groups, unrecognized by either management 
or government, into institutions sanctioned by law and 
accepted by employers. Fostered under a favorable govern-
mental climate since the early 1830's, the international 
unions have increased not only their membership and their 
financial resources, but also their politicaL and economic 
power. Professor Sumner H. Slichter has called American 
labor unions "the most powerful economic organizations 
which the country has ever sean.~ 
Everyone is more or less familiar with the role 
of unions in collective bargaining. Lese well-known is 
the role of unions in the financial sphere. 
* 5, p. 2. 
5 
This facet of American unionism, however, has 
lately attracted more attention. In recent months there 
have been published several articles on this subject under 
rather sensationalized headlines: •Unions in the Big 
Jloney, • •Late st in Union High Finance," 11Unions--A Bill ion 
Dollar Business,• •Unions Wield Vast Financial Power.• 
These articles spring from the reali~ation that 
unionism is, in fact, a multi-billion dollar business. 
Unions, from a multiplicity of sources, have accumulated 
tremendous sums of money. As the amounts Of these funds 
grow, the problem of how they are to be invested becomes 
more and more important. 
The investment problem facing the unions at the 
present time is in reality a two-fold one: First, how 
are unions to invest their money so as to preserve and 
safeguard their principal without undue fluctuations in 
the market value of their capital, and, second, how can 
unions invest their funds so as to secure the best pos-
sible yield consistent with the first objective, Unions 
are said to be in a unique position, economically speaking, 
which accounts for their unusual investment problem. A 
union •ay accumulate vast monetary reserves which, on the 
one hand, may never be needed, or which, on the other 
hand, may be urgently needed on very short notice, The 
ability of a union to weather a strike depends to a great 
extent on the amount .!a!!. .1!!!. liguidi ty of its funds. 
6 
This issue of liquidity is one of the crucial problems of 
any union 1 s investment program. It will be one of the 
major conclusions of this study that this difficulty has 
been greatly exaggerated by union leaders, and that a 
rational investment policy for modern labor unions does 
not require the maintenance of as large a percentage of 
their funds in highly liquid form. 
B. Sisni!icance ~!h! Problem 
More than 16 million Americans belong to labor 
unions, Only in England and Sweden are larger relative 
portions of the labor force organized. These union mem-
bers pay millions of dollars every year to their unions. 
Thus the money unions hold actually belongs to these people. 
Union investment policy is therefore of direct concern to 
about 1~ of our entire population. In addition, millions 
of non-unionized workers are directly affected by union 
bargaining activities and union contracts. It is certainly 
no exaggeration to say that the bargaining power of a union 
is quite often in direct proportion to its financial strength. 
Thus the success or failure or union policy 11) carrying out 
its investment objectives is of great concern to the major-
ity of workers, and hence to almost all businessmen. The 
significance of union investments is, then, even greater 
than would be imagined from their dollar amount. 
The effects of union funds upon the securities 
markets must also be considered, Any significant change 
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in union investment policy would have a profound effect on 
the securities markets. For example, a change in present 
union policy to one only slightly leas conservative, could 
result in millions of new dollars coming into the securities 
markets. 
Probably the first step in any discussion of the 
importance of labor union investment policy spould be the 
assessment of the total amount of funds unions have at 
their disposal. It is one of the primary objectives of 
this study, therefore, to ascertain as accurately as pos-
sible, the sum of all the funds in the hands of , or under 
the control of, American labor unions. 
c. Prior work in lli Field 
Perhaps the most striking fact to be noticed 
about the previous work done in the field is the scarcity 
of it. A few rather half-hearted attempts have been made 
to analyze certain parts of the problem. For example, 
Life Magazine in 1948 attempted to gather data on the total 
assets of labor unions.* A few studies have been made of 
the sources of union income. i.e., dues, initiation fees, 
etc.** None of these projects, however, resulted in a very 
*15, P• 80. 
**16, p. 219. 
17, p. 253. 
5, p. 113. 
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complete or accurate picture of the situation they set out 
to portray. 
The only full-scale analysis of labor union in-
vestment policy that has been undertaken to my knowledge, 
is by Professor Nathan Belfer, of Pennsylvania State Col-
lege.* His analysis was based on financial reports obtained 
from the f9rty largest unions in the country at the time of 
his study. This methodology raises certain doubts as to 
the general validity of his conclusions. First of all, we 
must realize that the largest unions (in terms of total 
membership) are no.t necessarily the richest u~ions (in terms 
of either total assets or per capita assets), and secondly, 
a sample of forty unions selected from the total of over 
200 in the country today may not~ a reliable one, especially 
when, as we shall see, many of the smaller (and compara-
tively richer) unions follow an investment policy substan-
tially different from that of the larger unions. Perhaps, 
and this is another of the most important questions that 
this study will attempt to resolve, the greater relative 
wealth of certain unions is .!B! to the fact that their in-
vestment policy is different from that of the majority. 
In addition to those difficulties in accepting 
Belfer• s conclusions as valid for the present time, is the 
fact that his study was completed four years ago. 
* 37. 
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The question arises: Since that time has there 
been any real change in ~btl-Qagphy',beliind:,union ,in1lutments? 
These critic isms are not meant to deprecate the 
value o! Professor Belfer's work. On the contrary, a more 
complete investigation has only conviuced me that the con-
clusions Belfer drew !rom his data concerning asgregate 
union investlll6lnts were quite valid !or the period involved. 
I do believe, however, that much more important conclusions 
can be drawn !rom the differences between unions as to their 
investment policy. It i.s:,;much more significant that some 
unions have been able to obtain greater returns on their 
investments than other unions without undertaking an inju-
dicious degree o! risk, than that unions as a whole are not 
getting high returns on their investlll6lnts. It is the in-
tent ion of this study, the re!ore, to compare the investment 
results o! many unions and determine whether or not it would 
be wise !or all unions to adopt the investment policies o! 
those few unions which have been very successful in the 
financial sphere. 
Perhaps the main reason !or the scantiness o! 
~ork in this field bas been the difficulty of obtaining 
concrete facts on the problem. An analysis of union in -
vestment policy necessarily depends upocl"! getting reliable 
figures on union investments. income, assets, etc. These 
figures have been difficult or impossible to obtain in the 
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past, but are becoming increasingly available. Under the 
Taft-Hartley Act, national unions are required to submit 
to the Department of Labor, detailed financial statements 
(a statement of income and expenditures, and a balance 
sheet), and to make these reports available to any bona 
fide member of the union who wishes to see them, There 
is no provision, however, requiring unions to make these 
reports available to the general public. Many unions, 
nevertheless, have followed a policy of giving wide pub-
licity to these financial statements. Some unions. notably 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the United 
Steelworkers of America, and the American Federation of 
Hosiery Workers followed this practice even before the 
Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947. Emil Rieve, presi-
dent of the Textile Workers Union of America (CIO) in 1947 
stated, ni do not believe ,efusal to make public a union's 
financial statement is defensible today, and I tbiink Con-
gress shoUld require it. •* 
It is this increasing willingness on the part 
of unions to disclose the financial details of their 
operations to the general public that has made this study 
possible. 
D. ObJe cti vea Of This Study 
Briefly, the objectives of this study may be 
summarized as follows: First, an attempt to measure the 
*19, p. 32 
11 
total wealth of all unions in a more complete and accurate 
fashion than has been done before; second, an analysis of 
union investment policy as it has evolved in recent years 
to its present stage. Closely connected with this second 
problem is the question of whether unions will or can or 
should obtain a voice in management through purchase of 
common stocks. Third, I hope to point out some of the 
reasons for the extreme conservatism of most union invest-
menta. Too many articles have been written criticizing this 
ultraconservatism without displaying any awareness of the 
special characteristics of labor unions that have made such 
a policy not only reasonable, in the past, but perhaps also 
necessary. Fourth, I intend to point out some of the faults 
inherent in present union investment policy, and, lastly, 
to propose some possible solutions to the problem. These 
objectives are not really independent. For example, in 
examining some of the reasons for union conservatism, we see 
more clearly not only some of the faults of union investment 
policy, but also some of the possible improvements that 
could be made. 
E. Method£! Approach 
The methodology of this study is basically ver,r 
simple. Fin4ncial reports are detailed and up-to-date as 
possible were obtained from unions representing over 
15,500,000 of the nation's 15-million-plus union members. 
In many cases balance sheets for 1954 were used (these 
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were for various dates in 1954 as the fiscal 
periods of many unions differ from one another, but in the 
majority of cases 1955 figures were available and in several 
cases figures from 1953 or even earlier were the latest 
obtainable. 
This approach involved not only an analysis of 
union investment policy as a whole, but also the more care-
ful study of certain exceptionally success~ul union invest-
ment practices, with the aim of discovering if these 
exceptional practices coUld be followed profitably by the 
majority of unions. 
A list of the unions included in the study will 
be found in Table IV. 
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II. The Growth of American Labor Unions 
A, .Membership 
In 1792 the journeymen shoemakers of Philadelphia 
formed the first labor union in the United States. Within 
the next ten years, union.s of shoemakers, carpenters, and 
printers were founded in Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, 
New York, and several other cities. Since that time there 
has been a strong, though by no means steady, growth in the 
number and strength of American labor unions. 
Until after the Civil War, each depression wiped 
out unionism almost completely. Union membership still tends 
to decline during depression and revive during prosperity. 
The striking fact is that, after each decline in union member-
ship, the movement has come back stronger than before. As 
Lloyd G. Reynolds has pointed out: 
The growth of unionism over the past 
hundred and fifty years has been similar to the 
rolling up of waves on a beach when the tide is 
rising. After each wave, there is a slipping 
back down the beach, but each new wave reaches 
a higher point than the one before it,* 
The period of greatest growth in union membership 
has been in the fifteen years following the depression of the 
1930's, In 1933 total union ••mbership was approximately 
3,000,000. It is now estimated that union membership is close 
to 17,000,000. Table I shows the growth that has taken place 
in some of the larger unions in the past twanty years. 
*1, p. 49. 
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Table I 
Jlembers!:/.ip of Selecte.d Natl.onal Unions 
1932, 1952 agel 1955 
a,erican Federation of Labor 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, \'fare-
housemen and Helpers 82,000 1,000,000 1,231,000 
Carpenters and Joiners 290,ooo 
Machinists 70,000 
Electrical Workers 139,900 
Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees and Bartenders 29,300 
Ladies' Garment Workers 40,000 
Hod Carriers, Building & 
Common Laborers 90,000 
Railway and Steamship Clerks, 
Freight Handlers, Express 
and Station Employees 60,800 
Retail Clerks 8,700 
Musicians 100,000 
Painters, Decorators and 
Paperhangers 79,600 
Journeymen and Apprentices 
of the Plumbing and Pipe 
Fitting industry 45,000 
Street, Electric Railway and 
Motor Coach Employees 81,700 
Meat Cutters and Butchers 11,400 
Operating Engineers 34,400 
Building Service Employees 18,000 
Maintenance of Way Employees 37,100 
750,000 804,343 
699,298 864,095 
500,000 634,000 
402,000 412,946 
390,000 440,650 
386.000 433,125 
300,000 293,500 
250,000 265,000 
242,167 248,078 
208,189 220,000 
201,343 246,720 
200,000 190,000 
195,000 335,167 
187,180 200,000 
185,000 206,692 
182,831 219,191 
T-'le I (continaed) 
Alllerican :rede.ration ot Labor 
Bakery and contecti onary workers 17,900 
Boilermakers, Iron Shipiuildera 
Blacksmiths, Forgera and 
Helpera 15,ooo 
Pulp, Sulphite and Paper 
Mill workers 5,000 
Bridge, struct•ral and 
ornaaental Iron workers 12,000 
Railway carmeh 80,000 
Automobile ·o'lorkers -
Bricklayers, •asons and 
plaaterera 5i,OOO 
Laundry workers 5,500J 
Con&tesa ot Industrial orsanizationa 
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural 
Iaplement workers 
Steelworker a 
Clothing Workers 
Textile workers 
Communication Workers 
Electrical, Radio and Machine workers 
Rubber, cork, Linoleum and plaatic 
workers 
Packinchouse workers 
Woodworkers 
·1952 
172,000 
15 
1955 
liO,OOO 
150,000 150,000 
125,000 13t,5i2 
10i 1 700 lTO.OOO 
100,000. ~120,000 
100,000 1.7,li7 
100,000 73,20. 
1,18.,507 1,239,000 
1,100,000 1,114,000 
385,000 385,000 
3il,970 212,500 
300,000 300,000 
2i5,000 3il,OOO 
190,000 175,000 
1a2,iOO 84,ooo 
117,251 105,058 
Independent Unions 
Kine•orlters 
Railroad Trainmen 
Ta)le I (contin•ed) 
lt52 
iOO ,000 
20i ,813 
li 
lt55 
iOO,OOO 
204,3t7 
sources: The AFL data tor lt~2 come from L. L. Lorwin, 
The American Federation of Labor (washington: 
Brookin&S, lt33). The 1152 and lt55 figures 
are froa the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Director~ 
ot Labor unions in the United Stat.es, 1953 and it i. 
chart. I 
Trade-Union KembershiJ! in t.:b.e Unit.ed St.at.es 
1Bt7-lt52 
source: 1, p._ 48. 
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Sinee the end of world war II, however, there has 
lleen a period of relative stallili ty in llnion membership. 
There are several reasons tor this stallility which are 
frequently cited. These explanations, it valid, would also 
lead us to believe that llnion aeallership will not expand 
greatli in the next few years. The explaaations are based on 
certain characteristics of ~erican anionism. 
Nearly all of' the very large plants in the United 
States are already unionized, and these are the most fertile 
ground in which union membership crows. Also, the smaller 
tiras are somewhat harder to unionize because smaller firms 
do not have the seQ.ai tive puilic relations posi tiona of the 
larger firms. Another important explanation tor this stallility 
ot aembership is the fact that. during the ten years since the 
end ot the war, there has been a lack of strong motivations 
for workers to join unions.. The years from 1945 to the 
end of the w.ar, there has been a lack of strong motivations 
for workers to join unions. The years tram 1945 to the 
present have w1 thout esception !teen years of prosperity. 
younger workers have actually never experiences a depression, 
and hence do not feel the same need for maintain and belong-
ing to a strong labor organization tha~ their seniors do. In 
addition, due to the great nuaber of strikes immediately 
succeeding the end of the war, there has been in the United 
States somewhat of a reaction on the part of the.public against 
la~~r unions. The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 might 
18 
be ci~ed as evidence ot this reaction. union officials often 
blame the Taft-Har~ley Act tor the failure ot union membership 
to increase substantially in ~he post-war years. 
Thus i~ seems likely that we will not have in this 
country in the next several years any growth in union member-
ship comparable to the period tollowinc the depression ot the 
30•s. Most industrial workers are already unionized, so that 
any new wave of •nion growth mus~ come from the unionization 
ot workers in the service and aerchandisinc fields, where 
unionism has not as yet had no~able success. 
5. Financial Growth 
ASsUili.nc, then, that union membershi! will remain 
relatively stable in .the foreseeable future, what sicni ficance 
does this have for union finances? 
Union financial power &enerally grows very slowly 
in the early days of the union's existence, This is due to 
the fact that orcanizin& and striking are the two most 
expensive activi~ies in which any union can indulge. organ-
izinc exp,naes are, of course, necessary during the growth 
period ot any union. FUrtheraore, dues must be low during the 
organizinr; period so as to attrac~ new members. It als'o seems 
that fre~uent strikes are a peculiar characteristic of unions 
in the throes ot birth or growth pains. Thus any funds the 
union can collect during these periods of growth are usually 
prcmp~~y expended, leaving the dollar net worth of the union 
at a rather low level,. As the union reaches a point where 
u 
its position is consolidated, that is, when it has 'ecome a 
recoanized bar1ainins agent in the ~ndustry and has organized 
all t.he workers in the iQdlls~ry that it considers feasible 
or desirable, its financial stren&th will grow rapidly. 
Thus Business week reports: 
Generally, unions with the most money are 
the oldest. craft-type groups -- the indepen4ent 
railroad:brotherhoods and either affiliates 
or (in the case of the United Mine workers and 
thr International Association of Machinists) 
one-time affiliates of' the AFL. Most have 
been buildin& u·p their funds for a half-century 
or 1110re.* 
The above statement is, on the whole, accurate, but. 
it does not tell the whole story. It is true that. the older 
AFL unions are generally the richest, but. in ~ecent. years, with 
strikes less frequent. and organization activity largely com-
pleted, the CIO unions, as well as the independent. and AFL 
unions, have increased their treaaaries tremendously. Table II 
sbows the net worth of the twenty wealthiest unions in lt50 
as compared with their present. net. worth, and thus gives some 
indication of the tremendous financial gains most American 
labor unions have achieved in recent. years. The sources of 
union income will be discussed in the following chapter. 
of at least as great sisnificance for the problem 
of' union investment. policy as the funds in the treasuries of 
the unions, is the phenaaenal growth in recent years of 
pension plans and other welfare programs for workers. 
* 24, P• lli. 
Table II 
Asse~s Of Twenty Me•~ Wealtpy Unions 
uSb and 1955 
Uniou 
1. Railroad Trainmen 
2. Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen 
:3. Te8111aters 
4. Kine Workers 
5. Typographers 
6. Boiler Makers 
7. Carpemters 
e. Bricklayers 
t. Electric workers 
10. Ladies• &arment workers 
11. H9d carriers 
12. Railroad conductors 
1:3.. Steel Workers 
14. Opera~ing Engineers 
15. Locomotive Engineers 
16. Machinists 
17. Street, Electric Railway and 
Motor Coach Employees 
18. Clothing workerd 
lt. Plumbers 
20. Railway and Steamship Clerks 
Assets 
lt50 
$55'3 
:35.3 
~ 21.0 
~20.0 
16.6 
13.5 
u.s 
'1.0. 6 
10.0 
10.0 
~ 8.8 
e.o 
6.7 
6.6 
6.5 
6.2 
20 
(111lliOn8) 
lt55 
$49.0 
:34.0 
16.2 
18.1 
15.3 
17.8 
13.7 
12.8 
12.6 
17.6 
llo8 
lt.o 
14.0 
11.4 
e.1 
10.6 
Source: Union Financial reports & convention proceedings 
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In 15147, premiWDs for croup accident. and health 
insurance totaled 300 million dollars; by January 1, 1953, 
the total had risen to onr a billion dollars a year. The 
volume of group life insurance has increased 80~ in five 
years, with 64 billion dollars of insurance currently in 
force and annual pre&~iUJIS of 750 million. This growth is 
very largely the result of union action. Today, about eleven 
million workers are covered by sroup insurance through 
collective bargaining, and pension fund reserves total about 
24 billion dollars; those reserves are increasing at a rate 
of oYer two billion dollars a year.* The amount. of ~hese 
reserves under direct union control •is tar in excess of one 
billion dollars.•** 
There are t.wo main t.ypes of union welfare agreement.s. 
One is pensions, handled ei t.her by an insurance company or 
by a fund on a self-insured basis. The other is social in-
surance, which consists ot st.raight life insurance and of 
accident and health insurauce. Under the law, welfare pay-
mente need not. be administered by joinv union-management 
funds unless the union i-nsists upon part.icipat.ion. In basic 
steel, social insurance is handled by t.he employer who 
aegot.iat.es direct.ly with an insurance carrier. The welfare-
fund arrangement. involving a legal joint trusteeship between 
employer and union is most ccamon where there is m·ulti-
* 21, P• 140. 
** 13, p. ea. 
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employer bargaining in an industry--e.g., among teamsters, 
electricians, bakery workers, construction workers, etc. In 
these cases there is a considerable advantage in pooling the 
employees to obtain lower premium costs, simplify administra-
ti olll .. and provide continuity Gf coverage for 'Norkers who 
change jobs. 
Let us examine the organization of the uninsured or 
so called •self-administered" plans. In this case, a trust 
is created, annual contributions are made to it, "and the 
funds are invested under the direction of the trustees or 
a pension committee. The plan is actuarily determined and 
assumptions of interest, mortality and turnover are made on 
a conservatively realistic basis. The fund is entirely 
separate from the control of the company for the benefit of 
whose employees it is intended. •* 
At the present time the majority of employees wel-
fare programs are of the uninsur.ed type, with employers 
making a periodic payment to an established fund. The fund 
can be administered by either the employer, the union, or a 
Joint ccmmittee, At the present time, most of these funds 
are managed by the employer (generally by a trustee appointed 
by the employer). There seems, however, to be a tendency for 
the unions involved to desire a more direct control over the 
funds accumulated for the benefit of their members. The 
*7, F. 19. 
United Mine Workers control a fund of nearly 100-million 
dollars, the ILOWU administers employer-supported funds 
with a total nat worth of over $113,000,000, 
23 
There is no question but that the size of these 
funds, pension and other types, will continue to grow at a 
rapid rate. There is no question but that unions could 
exercise a greater and more direct control over the invest-
ment of these funds if they so desired, The real question, 
then, is whether unions will attempt to control more ~Lrect­
ly the investment of thlae huge reserves of the pension f~s 
already in existence and those that will come into being in 
the near future, As we will see later, union thinking alomg 
these lines of financial and investment policy is not advanced 
to the point where the control over such huge funds would be 
advantageous for themselves or for the econo~ as a whole 
However, it should be noted that a change in union policy 
could lead them to desire more control over these funds. 
III. Union Financial Strength 
A. Union Financial Statements 
It is the purpose of this chapter to come to some 
conclusions regarding the total amount of wealth controlled 
24 
by American labor unions. Under the provisions of the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), national 
unions must file each year with the Department of Labor a 
financial report consisting of a balance :sheet and a statement 
of income and expenditure.# In addition, the law requires 
the unions to issue these reports to all their members. The 
law does not require the unions to make these reports avail-
able to the general public, and this fact makes it impossible 
to reach a completely accurate and up-to-date conclusion 
regarding union wealth. 
Many unions, however, do, as a matter of policy, 
publicize their financial reports, This is dons in ~any cases 
by publishing them in the union magazine or newspaper. Fre-
quently the financial statements will be included in the 
reports of proceedings at the regular convention of the union. 
or in the annual report of the officers to the members. 
Many unions send copies of their annual financial statements 
to the public and university libraries that may request them,## 
# In addition, the following data are required: (1) names, ti-
tles, salaries and expenses of its three principal officers; 
(2) the initiation fees charged; (3) the dues or fees paid 
by the membership to retain good standing in the union; and 
(4), a detailed statement of its constitution and by-laws. 
##"The interested public can secure vopies .•• at approximately 
20 university libraries, a few public libraries, the Library 
of Congress, and the Department of Labor Library.• 
2, P• 24. 
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There are several unions which, though they do not actively 
seek widespread circulation of their financial reports, will 
nevertheless send copies of their statements to interested 
individuals or institutions that request them. 
It must Qs ~mphasized, however, that there is no 
law compelling un1ons: .. to make public their financial situation. 
Many unions, therefore, do not reveal their finances to other 
tb.(m bona fide members of the union. # One reason frequently 
given by union leaders for maintaining secrecy as to tb.eir 
financial condition is that their bargaining position would 
be weakened by employers having knowledge of the extent of 
union financial resources. The idea behind this, presumably, 
is that an employer could attempt to secure wage cuts, or 
resist unreasonably, wage increases, if b.e knew that the 
union's financial condition would not allow it to weather a 
prolonged strike. Undoubtedly, an objective analysis would 
reveal tb.at this conception is merely a rationalization of, 
rather than a reason for, union unwillingness to make finan-
cial information public. 
Another reason occasionally met for union failure 
to reveal finances is tb.e expense of preparing ana circulat-
ing financial reports. The fact is, b.owever, that all unions 
must prepare financial reports for tb.e Department of Labor 
#The UJ4W, in reply to a letter requesting a financial report, 
stated, "The provisions of the International Constitution 
limits distribution of this report to authorized representa-
tives of our Organization and local unions comprising the 
United Mine Workers of America." 
26 
and their members, and the extra expe nses involved in printing 
or mimeographing additional oopies of the statements are negli-
gible. There seems to be little reason why unions shou~u nu~ 
reveal puoliGly their financial reports, and it would seem that 
a nation which has laws requiring disclo:~ure of financial facts 
concerning private business organizations# should require the 
discl~sure of the financial conditions of labor unions. 
In all fa.irness to American labor unions, it should 
be pointed out that the vast majority do publicize, or at 
make available, information concerning their financial status. 
This is especially true of the larger unions, which generally 
issue very minutely detailed financial reports. The most 
notable exception to this tendency is the United Mine Workers. 
The extent of the UKW's public pronouncements on its financial 
cor:~dition for last year was a. statement in the Conven'flion 
Proceedings by president John L. Lewis to the effect that the 
union had 34-million dollars !!exclusive of other assets." In 
addition, it should be noted that the trend of recent years 
has been towards reporting publicly more and more fully their 
financial status by labor unions. The leader in this field 
has been the International ~adies' Garment Workers Union, 
which iss till one of the very few unions to include in its 
financial report the conditions the locals that make up the 
International Union. 
#"The purpose of the (Securities Act) of 1933 can be summed 
up in the single pr~~Aple of clear, truthful and adequa~e 
diseloaure •. , 
4. p. 20'3. 
This brings us to the most serious problem in 
obtaining figures of the total net worth of American labor 
unions: how can we determine the amount oi' assets held by 
union locals? We have seen that the national union must 
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prepare a financial report for the Labor Department, and that 
many unions publicize this report. There is no similar 
federal law which requires local unions to prepare and submit 
financial statements. There are~ however, several states# 
which do require local unions to file financial reports, but 
even in these states the reports filed with the State Depart-
ment of Labor are not necessarily available or open to the 
public. 
Thus any estimate of total union wealth is to a 
great extent based upon a guess of the relation of local 
assets to national assets. This guess must be based on the 
scanty. data that are available; the reports of the locals that 
ah•tobtainable, and the information provided by the national 
and to the financial condition of the locals (as provided by 
the ILOWU. 
The estimates that have been made range from a low 
of union assets adjudged equally divided netween the locals 
and the internationals, to the statement made by Dr. Alexander 
Lipsett that #many local treasuries are capable of matching 
every dollar in the till of their parent organization with 
#Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas. 
tour or five of their o·o~m,-~< From the evidence that I have 
\een a\le to gather, it seeme that this latter etatement is 
quite true; there are many local unions which individually 
have more wealth than the national or international organi-
zation to which they belong. For example, James Petrillo 
serves as president of the Chicago local of the ~erican Fed-
eration of Musicians, as well as acting as president of the 
national organization. Hie salary frOill each of these 
offices is probably ~oughl:Jipr.opott.ioilald.o the cllet worth of 
the two organizations. From the ~erican Federation of 
Musicians he draws a salary of $20,000 a year, and from the 
Chicago local he draws a salary of $26,000 a year. This 
I 
would indicate that the local had a greater net worth than 
the national federation. This is by no means a rare situa-
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tion but we have no way of determining just how prevalent it is. 
Thus we see that there are two facets to the problem 
o{ obtaining union financial statements. First, financial state-
ments are availabl.e or obtainable tor the majority of Interna-
tional unions, practically no reports of financial conditions 
of local unions are available. Once the financial statements 
are obtained, a new problem caaea into being. This new problem 
related to the interpretation of the financial reports themselves. 
The accounting practices of unions are unsystematic 
and unstandardized. A substantial portion of union wealth is 
invested in bonds. There are many different ways in which 
*9,p. 6. 
2!1 
bonds can be carried oh th~ books of the holder. They can 
' 
be shown at cost, at current market price, at par, and at 
cost plus accrued interest to list but a few. Different 
unions naturally choose to carry their bond holdings on their 
books in different ways. This in itself would cause little 
or no difficulty, but at times the same union will value its 
bonds by different methods, and very often there will be no 
indication which system is being used. Often United States 
Treasury bonds will be carried at par, and other bonds at 
cost or market. The International Association of Machinists, 
for example, carried its bonds at par, and writes off the 
discount or premium on bonds bought or sold as income or 
expense in the year bought or sold. As mentioned above, the 
difficulty arises when the method used is not specified. 
Property may be valued at cost, at a 
nominal value of $1 or $5000, or at tax 
assessed values. ReceiTable from locals 
or unions may represent amounts expected 
to be received or simply a memorandum of '""'--· '" 
amounts loaned with the intention that 
' 
........... ·; 
they shall be repaid. Assets may be 
written off slowly over their useful life 
or written off at once at the time of 
purchase.* 
Some unions follow a cash basis of 
accounting while others accrued their 1::1~i .~ 
etpe.oeellniliui::om»lbi :t.l\eir income. Some unions 
value their furalture and fixtures on the 
balance sheets; others do not.** 
The example of the type of problem caused by the 
unsystematic accounting practices of the unions can be found 
in the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants• 
* 2' p. 56. 
**2, p. 58 
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Union of North Aaerica. For a number of years the union 
listed an investment of $500 in the Johnson City Hotel among 
its assets. In 1949, auditors attempted to check the market 
or realizable value of the investment.. They discovered that 
the.hotel had gone bankrupt in 1133, and thus the stock was 
completely worthless. Therefore, since 1133 the members had 
been unaware that the investment as shown on the balance sheet 
was not available for the union's use in its operations. 
The carpenters' Union provides another example. 
A study of the union's current financial statement would 
not reveal that the international owned its headquarters 
building in Indianapolis, had spent f2,000,000 on the car-
penters• Home, and also owned the Adams Packing Company. 
In general, we can say that unions do not attempt 
to realistically value their real estate holdings, and sev-
eral unions do not depreciate their fixed assets. The 
reason given for not depreciating is that unions do not pay 
taxes on their income, so there is no reason to show a depre-
ciation expense. 
Mr. Kozmetsky has aptly summarized the situation 
by saying: 
The many different methods of reporting 
assets, liabilities, income and expense found 
to be used by unions lead to confusion and 
misunderstanding •••• The varied accounting 
practices and financial statements are not 
the result of a deliberate attempt to misrep-
resent the facts. ~ather they are the natu-
ral outgrowth of the rapid increase in the 
•ize of unions, the necessary concentrationu· 
of union leaders on activities which have not 
elaborate accounting, and the primary concern 
of the members 111 th the "honest" handling of 
their funds •••• Accounting principles andre-
porting were very enthusiastically discussed 
by the union leaders interviewed, which leads 
the writer to believe that. lack of knowledge 
of accounting,· the altaence of accepted account-
ing practices for unions, and an unawareness 
of the full implications of present accounting 
prac:Ucefl).are theccause.s for the current back- •. 
wardness of unlon accounting.* 
B. Sources of union Inccme 
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Ia 1943, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated 
that union income up to and above 390 million dollars a 
year. Since that time, unions, as tax-exempt organizations, 
have been required to file reports of business receipts with 
the Internal Revenue Servic·e· Fi~Ures for recent years are 
not yet available. Latest available figures show that, for 
1946, labor unions reported total receipts of $477,701,000. 
Today, union income is undoubtedly well over one-half of a 
billion dollars a year, and probable closer to 600 million 
dollars per year. This growth of union income is even more 
significant when we see that union expenditures have not 
increased nearly so much in the past ten years. Some of the 
reasons for this were pointed out previously. Union income 
and expenditures at present are such that the percentages of 
receipts re~ItAinin!;l af.~ar.UUJ.,;expam:lbt.w-eS.,:iramo"' higher than 
at any time in labor union history. This does not mean that 
there are not some unions Wbich have operated in the red for 
the pastiyear or two (the Boilermakers, for example, but 
* 2, P• 1!10. 
,-,. 
32 
such si tuat.ions are now much rarer than forG•erly. 
The bulk of union income is derived from initiation 
fees and from dues~ Initiation fees range from a few dollars 
in unions that are aggressively organizing and expanding to 
about prohibi)iYe sums in unions (such as motion picture 
operators) that seek to discourage membership. Dues are 
usually collected monthly and range from a miniMillll of about $'JaO" 
to several dollars a month. In discussions of union finance, 
the level of dues is often exaggerated by citing such high-dues 
organizations as the printers and the railway union--which 
provide their members with welfare benefits--as typical. Much 
m more representative, however, are the auto workers, charg-
ing $2.50 a month, and the steel workers, charging $3 a month. 
Even such nominal emounts can accumulate to large sums when 
the number of workers is high enough. u. s. Steel Corporation 
recently sent the USW a monthly check for nearly $500,000; 
the check sent to the USW by General Motors for dues collected 
in November, 1955, was a shade over $840,000. 
The mainstay of most international union treasuries is 
tha per capita tax--the international's share of dues col-
lected by the locals. A part of the initial fees also winds 
up in the international treasury. And, if they have to, 
internationals can levy special assessments. It should be 
noted, however, that the locals keep a larg~portion of the 
dues they colleclt-.t.mu• they send to the international organ-
ization. This is so"'e indication of the fact that locals 
treasuries as a whole are su'bstantialljt. wealthier than the 
in;ernationals, but we do not know the relative expenditures 
undertaken by the locall and the internationals. 
The international unions also have substantial 
. 
income from their securities and real estate investments. 
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Many unions, in addition to these more or lees standard types 
of inc0111e, also receive inc0111e fr0111 the various businesses 
•hich they own or control. For example, The Mine workers 
control two large banks in washington, D.C. Texas locals, 
affiliated with the AFL, own two•thirds of a large insurance 
company in Texas. Other examples of union business ac-
tivity will be presented in later chapters. 
c.. Estimate of Total Union Assets 
Estimating total union assets has been a popular 
pastiae among writers on the subject of labor union finances 
in recent years. Perhaps the moat important reason for its 
popularity is the tact that no one has undertaken a c0111pre-
' -- , '; 1. ,, " 
hensive aurvey of union wealth, so that no estimate, no 
matter how unreasonable, could be proved wrong. Guesses as 
three or four union financial statements are c011111on. 
u. s. News & World Report estiLJated recently the 
'lal!l.%8 ~~ of 1 ~r;t! ~;>.llS-:-:-.! 9'!\lL national and i nte rna ti onal-- ..• at 
1 J,.o l.o billion dollars."* Dr. Lipsett stated that "the 
* 29, p. 64· 
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American labor movement has a net worth of three billion to 
four billion, most of it in the hands of the union locals,"* 
One estimate of total union wealth put it at about $8,000,000. 
Joseph Gambatese of Nation's Business stated that union 
assets are, "an estimated $1,000,000 in in union treasuries and 
$5,000,000 in welfare fund reserves (!'lot including pensions) 
over which unions eJCercise at least some control."*~' Other 
estimates of the total amount of 'unds over which unions have 
complete control or (in the case of many welfare plans) share 
control with employer representatives, run as high as seven 
to eight billion dollars. 
Iathan Belfer made an excellent study of total 
union wealth in 1949, which is probably the most thorough 
study yet made of the subject. Unfortunately, this study 
is rather outdated because of the great increase in union 
wealth in the last several years. 
Professor Belfer's method involved writing to the 
fifty or sixty largest labor unions in the United States 
(comprising about eleven million members~< and requesting them 
to send him a copy of their latest financial statements. He 
was able, from the information provided, to estimate total 
funds held by international unions to be about 350 million 
dollars. 
The method I used in computing union wealth was 
basically the same, with the exception that I started with 
* 'i,. p. !1:6 .. 
*38', ' p •. 46-•. 
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a substantial amount of information gathered from an analysis 
of the manY union financial statements collected by the Dewey 
library of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since 
their file of union financial reports is not complete (re-
ports were not available for many small and several large unions) 
and in many cases not up-to-date. I therefore wrote to all the 
international unions with a membership of over 5,000 and which 
were listed in the 1955 edition of the Labor Department's 
Directorr of Labor Unions in the United States, for which 
unions I did not have a current (December, 1954) balance sheet: 
The majority of unions replied to mu first letter, many in-
eluding financial statements. Some (generally the unions 
with very small ... earalip) stated that their funds were"not 
aUffiOletiT.lY large to merit my attention." Several indicated 
that their finances were none of my business. A second letter 
was sent to the larger unions which did not respond to the 
first letter, but with practically no success. 
Totaling the data I do have, I find that I have 
financial reports from 86 unions with a total membership of 
over 15,644,247.# Since authorities estimate total union 
membership in the United States at between sixteen and seven-
teen million, this is a fairly complete compilation. The sum 
of the net worths of these 86 unions is about $566,778,000, 
This includes all funds which these unions consider as part 
#Membership figures for the International Union of Electric 
and Radio Workers are not available. See Table III, 
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of their treas~ry. That is, it does not include pensions and 
welfare funds w~ich they administer in co6peration with 
employer repreuntatives, or which they administer &h•em-
selves if the funds are not included as part of their op-
erating treasury. Thus, for example, the Amalgamated Clothing 
Table III 
Membership and Net Worth 
American Labor Unions 
Unions 
Auto Norkers (CIO) 
Auto Workers (AFL) 
Bakery & Confectionary workers 
Boilermakers 
Bookbinders 
Brewery, Flour, Cereal Workers 
Bricklayers 
Building Service Employees 
Carpenters 
Cement & Lime li'orkers 
Chemical ·workers 
Cigar Makers 
Clothing Workers 
American Communications Asso. 
Communications •workers 
Electric Radio Workers 
Electric, Radio, Machine Workers 
IBE\f 
Operating Engineers 
Fire Fighters 
Furniture workers 
Ladies' Garment Workers 
Glass Bottle Blowers 
Glass & Ceramic Workers 
Glass ·aorke rs 
Hatters 
Hod Carriers 
Hosiery Workers 
Hotel & Restaurant Workers 
Iron & Bridge workers 
Lathers 
Laundry Workers 
Leather Goods, Plastics workers 
Letter Carriers 
l.ithogltJ!.pbus 
be<coJDoUYec Sngineers 
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen 
Longshoremen 
Lo•gshoremen and Warehousemen 
Machinists 
Maintenance of way Employees 
Mining Engineers 
Maritime & Shipbuilding Workers 
Kari time Workers 
Masters, Mates & Pilots 
Meat Cutters & Butchers 
Membership 
1, 239,000 
120,000 
160,000 
150,000 
54,316 
62,000 
147,157 
206.692 
804,343 
38.246 
90,000 
9,640 
385,000 
7,000 
300,000 
361,000 
630,000 
200,000 
85,000 
50,000 
440,650 
51,000 
47' 150 
30,000 
40,000 
433,125 
15,000 
412,946 
139,462 
15,301 
73,204 
15,000 
103,000 
27,976 
71,481 
96,432 
65,000 
65,000 
864,095 
219,191 
9,000 
50,000 
43,000 
9,500 
.. 335,167 
37 
Net Worth 
$39,405,000 
434,966 
6,281,889 
18,061,000 
1,788,942 
1,145,410 
17,785,000 
974,190 
15,278,372 
402,354 
678,727 
157,066 
8,054,533 
52,158 
3,202,897 
438,549 
1,527,022 
13,700,000 
11,813,000 
162,774 
92,524 
12,752,049 
178,582 
724,035 
1,509,393 
155,590 
12,617,914 
314,713 
5,050,650 
10,793,173 
632,294 
423,567 
337:,.816 
739,621 
2,562,000 
19,046,874 
34,537,205 
128,940 
11,792,310 
14,009.583 
7,018,179 
.... ' 44,000 
135,555 
5, 555.312 
25,377 
5, ~8&; ,371 
Table III (continued) 
Union 
Mine, Mill &: Smelter Workers 
Progressive Mineworkers 
UM« 
Molders & Foundry Workers 
Musiciana 
Newspaper Guild 
Of ace Employees 
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers 
Packinghouse Workers 
Painters 
Papermakers 
Pattern Makers 
Photo-Engravers 
Post Office Clerks 
Potters 
Printing Pressmen 
Pulp Sulphite Workers 
Railroad Trainmen 
Railway Carmen 
Rail way Clerks 
Railway Conductors 
Retail Clerks 
Rubber & Cork Workers 
Seafaring ~Yorkers 
Sleeping Car Porters 
Stage Workers 
State, County&: Municipal Employees 
Steelworkers 
Street Electric Railway 
Teachers 
Teamsters 
Telegraphers 
Textile Norkers 
Tobacco Workers 
Transport i'lorke rs 
Transport Service Employees 
Typographers 
Uphol ste re rs 
Utility Workers 
Wood Workers 
Membership 
100,000 
28,000 
600,000 
65,000 
248,078 
26,936 
60,000 
180,000 
84,000 
200,000 
72,700 
13,000 
16,032 
101,576 
23,674 
98,967 
149,942 
204,397 
170,000 
293,500 
31,800 
265,000 
175,000 
44,300 
15,000 
42,000 
96.328 
1,194,000 
190,000 
45,140 
1,231,000 
30,000 
292,500 
38,114 
90,000 
8,000 
96,455 
52,836 
81,000 
105,058 
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Net worth 
$50,874 
1,572,000 
34,039,833 
5,825,477 
5, 533,800 
150,036 
103,008 
832,192 
755,000 
5,092,597 
1. 753 '114 
779,952 
790,000 
381,000 
5,174,000 
6,712,778 
3,550,000 
49,241,000 
6 '180, 000 
10,547,274 
8,264,000 
3, 694,000 
1,739,000 
72,000 
649,000 
847.000 
120,000 
17,626,000 
11,358,784 
13,000 
34,627,193 
37,000 
3,093,000 
491,734 
329,000 
63,oo8 
16,238,000 
35,000 
416,000 
391,000 
Workers list their total net worth as $8,000,000, though they 
control several insurance funds with total reserves of over 
$100,000,000. 
We have seen that most estimates of funds at the 
disposal of national and international unions have erred p 
on the conservative side, Estimating the total amount of 
funds of which unions have control for purposes of investment 
is subject to much more guesswork. A conservative estimate 
as to net worth hel~ by local unions wo~ld be at least twice 
the amount held by the internationals (though it is probably 
more). This would give us a final e.stimate of total funds 
in union treasuries of at least one and one-half billion 
dollars. This figure is exclusive of the amount unions con-
trol under agreements with employers as to welfare plans and 
pension funds. This estimate, therefore, includes only funds 
which unions consider part of their own treasury, and not 
funds held in trust. Kr. Gambatese has estimated the amount 
in welfare reserves (not including pensions) over which 
unions have some control at five billion dollars. To some 
extent this depends upon our definition of •control," but 
if by some measure of control we mean representation on a 
joint board of trustees or sole trusteeship of the fund 
(and not me rely the fact that the fund is part of the col-
lective bargaining contract), then Mr. Gambatese's estimate 
is, in all probability, accurate or possibly a little on the 
high side. The amount in pensions funds which are under more 
or less direct union control is probably substantially in 
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excess of one billion dollars. Thus, the total amount of 
funds under union control is probably between 7 and 9 bil-
lion dollars. 
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The significance of the employer administered and in-
sured welfare funds and pension plans for this question is 
that they are subject to bargaining and, should American labor 
unions at any time in the future decide that they want a more 
important role in determining the investment of these huge 
funds, they undoubtedly woUld be able to get this power. At 
present they do not wish to have this power, but the need for 
a more rational investment policy on the part of unions may put 
them in the position of finding it necessary to have an in-
vestment staff, and with a staff on the payroll, perhaps they 
might decide to make a wider use of it. Or, as unions learn 
more about investments and the investment field, as they must 
when their funds grow, they may want a larger voice in the 
investment of these funds. Or, if any of the solutions to the 
problem of union investment policy which will be presented in 
a later chapter are adopted, this would result in a greater 
interest in the investment of the pension and welfare funds 
which are now accumulating, and will continue to accumulate,; 
for the benefit of their members. 
Thus we see that the funds which unions how have 
at their disposal are large enough so that a full-scale 
study of their investment policy is well warranted, and the 
possibility that unions may extend vastly the sums over which 
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they exercise control makes tne problem even more important. 
IV. Earlier Union Investment Policy 
It is only in relative recent years that union 
investment policy has become an important subject. In the 
years before World War II, unions in general did not have 
funds large enough to make inventment policy an important 
problem for the unions themselves. Union treasuries grew 
through the war years and the years thereafter. 
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The first study of union investment policy of any 
detail was made by Professor Belfer in 1952.* It appears 
that a brief review of the conclusions reached by Professor 
Belfer in his research (as well as the conclusions of other 
writers of about the same time) would be extremely valuable 
as it should reveal what, if any, significant changes have 
taken place in the past few years, years in which union funds 
have grown tremendously. 
Professor Belfer started with an estimate of total 
union resources of about one billion dollars in local and 
international union treasuries.# This figure does not include 
welfare and pension funds over which unions have investment 
control. 
Belfer found that most union funds were concentrated 
in highly conservative investments. They generally kept a 
fairly large percentage of their funds in cash and checking 
accounts. The greater part of their funds were either de-
* 11' p. 37 
# This estimate was based on the examination of financial 
reports of the forty largest unions in the U. S. 
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posited in savings accounts or invested in government bonds. 
He also noted that to a great extent the government bonds 
held were non-marketable savings bonds which can be redeemed 
at cost plus accrued interest at any time, r~ther than 
marketable U. s. Treasury Bonds which, if immediate liquida-
tion were desired,_ might have tp be sold at a loss. 
Another important investment outlet for union funds 
in 1952 was the real estate field,* Real estate consisted 
largely of union owned headquarters, In addition to this, 
various unions maintain rest homes, camps, and health centers 
for their members. The Carpenters have a home for aged mem-
bers in Lakeland, Florida, located on a 2000 acre tract with 
room for 400 members. The Printing Pressmen maintain a com-
bined home, tuberculosis sanitasium and trade school in 
Northeastern Tennessee. The Typographical Union has a home 
near Colorado Springs with a capacity for 455, Three railroad! 
brotherhoods operate a home near Chicago with a capacity for 
135, and the Railroad Conductors operate a home at Savannah, 
Georgia. The International Ladies• Garment Workers maintain 
fifteen health centers for members. These cent.ers represented 
a total investment of about three million dollars in 1949 
(this has been expanded further in the years since the Belfer 
study). The Auto Workers have over a quarter of a million 
dollars invested in their bea~t~ institute, Seveaal unions 
support City of Hope, a large hospital in Los.Angeles which 
* 11, p. 341. 
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provides free medical and hospital services to union members. 
It would appear from this data that most union real 
estate holdings are not operated for profit, and this is the 
conclusion which Belfer came to regarding union investment in 
this field. He noted several exceptions, however. The 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers owns several large office 
nuildings in Cleveland. The BrLcklayers Union owns the Bowen 
Building in Washington, D.C. The Mine Workers in 1949 purchased 
four buildings in the nation's capital for nearly two and one-
half million dollars. 
Unions in 1950, as at present, had-.·si&eablELho~dings 
of mortgages. These, however, were not usually commercial 
investments. The mortgages were mainly on union headquarters 
and union-spomsored housing projects. The Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers have sponsored three such projects in New York 
City with a total of 2463 apartments, representing a total 
investment of twenty million dollars. The ILGWU sponsored 
a low-rental housing project of 1600 dwellings in New York 
City. The union's pension fund invested 7.5 million dollars 
in the project in the form of a 4.5~ insured mortgage. The 
Joint Pension Fund of Local 3 of the International Brotherhood 
of Electric Workers has invested a quarter of a million 
dollars in a 2000 apartment housing development in New York. 
The Textile Workers (in Virginia), the Hosiery Workers (Phil-
adelphia, and various locals in Racine, Wisconsin, have 
Sponsored the financing and construction of housing projects 
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in these places. These were later sold to private interests. 
Unions have generally not been as adverse to entering 
the banking field as they have most other commercial fields. 
Union banks were a favorite type of union activity during the 
1920's. There were 36 union banks in 1929. Unfortunately, 
only four of these banks survived the depression of the 30's. 
Be,ween 1920 and 1926, the Locomotive Engineers acquired four-
teen banks, a,·t'e.ll;lty and mortgage company, several thrift com~.,· 
panies, an insurance company, an interest in a bank in Wall 
Street and in another in Florida, a holding company, an in-
vestment company, and a security corporation. The grandiose 
schemes of the Engineers resulted in enormous losses. The 
Engineers assessed each member twenty dollars a month for 
twenty months to help ·cover the losses, The remaining debt 
was gradually paid off by 1945.* 
This widespread failure of union..:run banks in the 
1930 1 s 1 s one of the moe t iaportant reasons for the conserva-
tive policy unions follow at the present time. An official 
of the Railway Clerks Union' stated that, "'l'e learned the 
lesson ••• that the proper business ~fa labor upion is to pro-
mote the welfare of working people through processes of col-
l~ctive bargaining.• ** 
Belfer also mentioned-several other activities in 
which unions engaged on a non-profit making basis. These 
* 11, pp. 343..;4, 
** 11 ' p. 344. 
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include such activities as newspapers and radio stations. 
Unions, naturally, are interested in creating and maintaining 
a favorable attitude towards unions and unionism on the part 
of the general publ1 c. Some unions, to further this end, 
have entered the radio business. After World War II, the 
ILGWU opened three li'M stations and the UA!f started two. These 
were not successful, largely because of the failure of FM to 
develop commercially. By 1952 all these stations had been given 
up.TheiLGW lost an estimated $1,000 on its ventures into the 
radio bUsiness. At the present time, the only union-owned radio 
station in the United States is WCFL, in Chicago, which is 
owned by the Chicago Federation of Labor.* 
The International Typographical Workers have set up 
nine daily papers to provide jobs for unemploye.d members. 
T~ese papers are not now operating profitably, but they have 
provided many jolla for many otherwise jobless members,** 
Investment in common stock was practically non-
existent. It was pointed out by Belfer that many unions hold 
stock in the Union Labor Life Insurance Company, an enterprise 
organized in 1925 by the AFL for the purchase of writing 
group and individual insurance policies for unions and their 
members. This insurance company is owned and controlled by 
unions affiliated with the AFL. Belfer commented on ~his laok 
of interest in common stock ownership by pointing out that, 
* 11, p. 346, 
**ibid. 
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"It is somewhat surprising to find that in the investment of 
their own funds unions do not appear to be participating to 
any great extent in American ind.ustrial development.•* 
There are a few unions which did have sizeable 
common stock investments (notably the International Brother-
hood of Operative Potters which has 721. of its assets invested 
in ~quitysecurities), but most unions invested their funds in 
a much more conservative manner. 
There were some indications that a change was taking 
place in union thinking co~cerning investment policies and 
practices about the time of Belfer's study. Business Week of 
April 29, 1950, for example, reported on an Israeli housing 
project spomsored jointly by the ILGWU and the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers. These two international unions invested a 
sizeable sum in bonds issued to finance the housing project. 
Then, more significantly, the two unions advised the local 
unions affiliated with them to invest in the project's bond 
issue. Business week emphasized that, "The International 
unions recommend for the first time that the joint boards 
and local unions invest in a private enterprise.•** 
As pointed out in the introduction, it is one of the 
principal purposes of this study to attempt to evaluate any 
change that may have taken place in the last few years in 
union thinking regard.lnss investment policy. We should now 
* 11, 
**25 J 
p. 337. 
p. 105. 
turn to an examination of present union investment policy 
and see if there is any perceptible change in un.ion policy, 
and attempt to evaluate these policies in the light of the 
special requirements and characteristics of a labor union. 
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V. Present Union Investment Policy 
A. Union Investments: A!lsresate 
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Since Professor Belfer completed his study of labor 
union -investment ,policy in 1952,, there has been, as we have 
seen, a substantial growth in union investment funds. There 
has not yet, however, been a real change in the principles 
governing the investment of these funds, though there is some 
evidence that a change is now taking place. We shall see 
that unions are still extremely conservative in the investment 
of their funds. The bulk of union assets is still in govern-
ment securities. It is, however, difficult to make valid 
gene raliza tiona about ao diverse 8~ SI1PUP as .. ·Amecioan labor 
unions. While many unions, indeed the vast majority, have 
no funds invested at all in common stocks, there are several 
with substantial investments in equity sec~rities. 
In general, union funds are invested in much the 
same way that the funds of conservative business firms are 
invested. There is, of course, a heavy accent on government 
securities. Lesser a~ounts are used to purchase stocks and 
bonds of corporations. Some unions have substantial mortgage 
and real estate holdings. several unions carry on large 
business enterprises of their own. 
Of the total funds held by the international unions 
(well over half a billion dollars), approximately 1~ are 
held in the for.m. of cash or checking accounts. About 60% 
of union funds are invested in United States Government Bonds. 
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Over 1~ are invested in bonds of American states and muni?i• 
palities and Canadian provinces, About 3f. of union funds are 
deposited in savings accounts,# 
Some characteristics of this union investment in 
state and municipal securities are worth noting. First, 
interest on state and municioal bonds is free from federal 
income taxation. This makes them extremely desirable from 
the point of view on the wealthy indivi.d.ual investor. The 
demand for these securities on the part of these investors 
forces their yields to very low levels when compared wuth 
corporate securities of comparative quality. Thus it is 
almost incomprehensible to see unions invest such a signifi-
cant portion of their assets in such securities because 
unions, by law, are exempted from federal income taxation. 
Thus we find unions in the somewhat ludicrous position of 
paying a premium to own securities whose main attraction is 
that the return on them ·is tax free, while unions would not 
have to pay taxes on any security they owned. To some extent, 
the size of union investment in municipal securities is a 
measure of the lack of knowledge of the investment field on 
the part of union leaders. There is another factor, _however, 
which should be considered. Many labor unions have articles 
in their constitutions which forbid investment in any securi-
ties other than those of the U. s. Government or its subdiv-
#Ubese figures are only approximat1ons, and are based on 
only a sample of the larger unions in the u. s. 
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ision, When a union desires a security furnishing a higher 
yi.ld than it can get by buying U. s. Government issues, 
its only alternative is a municipal bond, Many unions thus 
hold municipal bonds yielding five per cent, or even more in 
several cases. This is certainly an indication that the 
bond is of extremely poor quality, and, if the union were 
allowed to by itd constitution, it would be much safer in 
buying corporation bonds or even corporate preferred stock 
yielding the same return • 
International un_ions own millions of dollars worth 
of real estate, but much of this is not a money-making prop-
osition. It seems that unions, much like individuals, like 
to own their own home.s. Indeed, the growth of real estate 
holdings of unions is one of the most notable trends in the 
union investment field. The Teamsters completed last year 
a handsome marble-faced structure into which they moved from 
rented space in the building the Letter·carriers recently 
built, The latter got some help from the Bricklayers, who 
hold the mortgage, The Bricklayers, Mineworkers, Government 
employees, and others already own their own bui;Ld~ngs and, 
"in the past year there has been a spate of announcements 
of home buildings to be erected by CIO, AFL, IUE-CIO,Machin-
ists, and others. There may soon be almost as many buildings 
in Was~ington owned by unions as by the Government,"* 
* 12. 
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Mortgage holdings have shown a very significant 
· i·ncl'e'Ase in union portfolios in recent years. The main 
reason for this great growth is the existence of aortgages 
insured by agencies of the federal government (mainly the VA 
and the FHA). These investments yield the union over 4f. with 
great safety, though they are by no means as liquid as hold-
ings of government bonds or even many corporate securities.# 
The AFL Electrical Workers (IBEW) has gone strongly into 
mort.gages. Of its general funds, 18~ are invested in mort-
gages, and 68f. of its pension fund. 
Many unions have undertaken business enterprises of 
a varied character. Unions own banks in Washimgton, D.C., 
in Chicago, New York, Kansas City, and Newark. Unions also 
own insurance companies. In addition to the Union Labor Life 
Insurance Companies, American Standard Life Insurance Com-
pany is owned by the IBBII:, the Insurance Company of Texas is 
owned by AFL locals in Texas, and the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers own two insurance companies. 
Unions have gone into business to compete with un-
ftiendly employers or to provide jobs for unemployed members. 
The ILGWU built a plant to compete against a struck employer. 
As noted previously, the International Typographical Union 
startl!d eleven newspapers to provide jobs for members, but 
most of these have since folded. Local 678 of the United 
# The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fanny Mae) was 
chartered in 1938 to provide a secondary market for nome 
mortgages insured by Government agencies. See 3, p. 190. 
optical and Instrumental Workers, CIO, in U53 went. iut.o t.he 
wholesale optical business in st.. Louis to provide jobs for 
unemployed members. 
As f·ar as common stock inYestments were concerned, 
however, most unions seem t.o have little interest in expand-
in& their holdings. Total union holdings of common stocks 
comprise less t.h.O l~ of total union assets. Nat.uurally 
there are some exceptions t.o this general rule• The IBEW 
have $16,500,000 invested in common stocks. The Machinists 
have about t.wo million. These holdings, howeve~, represent 
only 2~ and 15~ respectively of the unions• assets. The 
;be union which has the majority of the assets in common 
stock is the smal1, but. fin~lcially active, Brotherhood of 
operative Potters. The brotherhood has only St,OOO members 
but. has assets in excess of $5,000,000. over 75:( of the 
union•s assets are invested in common stocks. More details 
concerning t.he Potter's invest.aent.s will be presented in the 
next. section of t.hi a chapter. 
Even the union stock holdings that. do exist. are 
extremely conservative. The IBIW buys only stock that. has 
paid dividends for 25 years. The Machinists buy only etock 
which is approved for trust. funds in washington, D.C. The 
Pot.t.ers buy insurance, 'bank, and ut.ilit.y stocks, and stay 
out. of industrial stocks almost completely. 
Many of t.he points that. have been made thus far 
will he better brought. out. by the following section. 
B. Union Investments: EX8111plea 
AlllALGAIIlATID CLOTHING WORKERS: 
The Hew york Times recently sta~ed that the total 
assets of the clothing workers are over a quarter of a million 
dollars. This includes over $100,000,000 in welfare funds, 
banks in New York and Chicago with total resources of 88 
million dollars, and credit unions with assets of several 
million dollars. Assets of the i~ternational union itself 
are nearly eight million dollars. of this eight million, it 
are in Government bonds (6&,(), fl,300,000 is invested in the 
banks controlled by the union, f6eO,OOO is in Canadian bonds, 
and a!aost ~100,000 is held in cash. The Clothing Workers 
also controLei.:g'ht insurance funds and two insurance companies 
with reserves of 106 million dollars. The union has a hous-
ing development valued at $23,000,000. In addition, with its 
joint boards and locals, the union has $23 million in cash 
and bonds and 10 million invested in properties of various 
kinds. 
BAKERY & CONFECTIONART WORKERS: 
The international union has a net worth of $6.28 
million. of this total, 53~ is invested in u. S. Government 
Bonds, 33~ in corporate bonds (of which over 90~ are of util-
i~/companies), and 5j€ is in CanadJan Government and Municipal 
Bonds. The union also has a f2t,OOO investment in the common 
stock of the Midwest Printing Company, and single shares of 
stock in four baking chains (probably for the purpose of 
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receiving financial report~). The return on the union's invest-
ments in recent years has always been under 3f.. 
BOILERMAKERS: 
over 55f. of the Union's $11.66 million net worth is in-
vested in u. s. Government Bonds. 311. is invested in two office 
buildings, part of one of which is used as union headquarters., . 
and 71. is in mortgages. The aortgage_s in this case are on''*"--'_;-, 
mercial property, and thus are not government insured. The 
union holds $'00,000 in cash. The boileraakers also own f~ 1 600 
of Brotherhood Bank stock, and have an investment of $40,9'0 
in New wyandotte Hotel common stock. 
UNITED AUTO WORKERS: 
At the end of lt5• the net worth of the Auto workers 
was $20., million. The union recently reported that during 
the year 1955 their assets nearly doubled, so t.hat as or-
December 31, 1!155, the net worth of the united Auto workers 
was $31., millions. The union reported that almost $32.2 
million was in liquid assets. The Auto Workers put a higher 
premium on liquidity than the majority of unions. They have 
1.51. of their assets in cash and 10)( in receivables. over 
5~ of the internat.ional•s assets are invested in u. s. Gov-
ernment Securities, mostly treasury Bills. Buildings and real 
estate compri-se 171. of the union's assets, and the union has 
sizeable holdings (2)( of total assets) of GMAC bonds. The 
Auto workers also own $11,878 worth of common stock, repre-
senting one share of stock from each company with which the 
union has a bargaining contract. The conservatism of the 
union's investments accounts for the fact that in 1954 the 
Auto Workers receivea a 1.23:1. return on their investments. 
STEEL WORKERS: 
Of USW assets of $18.1 million, $3.9 millions is in 
cash and $11.9 millions is in investment securities. The 
securities are all U. S. Governments with the exception of 
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one million dollars in municipals and $13,698 in common stocks 
of companies with which the union bargains. The cash holding 
is one of the largest, percentagewise, of any union holding. 
This may be distorted by the fact that the union may be look-
ing forward to the possibility of a strike in the near futu~e 
when the present contract runs out. 
The audited financial statement of the USW (in gen-
eral one of the best and most complete of any union financial 
statements) demonstrated one of the problems faced in analyzing 
~ion financial reports. Bonds are listed in a table at 
maturity value, market value, and "carrying value," which is 
the figure shown in the balance sheet. No explanation is given 
as to how such a figure is arrived at.# 
CARPENTERS : 
The Carpenters have a n•t worth of $15.3 million. 
This is also in highly liquid form, with 27:1. ($4.2 million) 
in cash and 65% in U. S. Governments. It is hard to justify 
such an investment program as this. The Carpenters have no 
#As long as the bonds are also at par and market, there 
is no difficulty involved in this case. Many other unions, 
however, do not indicate this other information. 
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real reason to hold 27~ of their assets in cash. The return 
on only two of the union's four million dollars in cash, if 
deposited in a Government-insured· savings account instead of 
a checking account, would earn up to fSO,OOO,OOO per year 
for the union at current rates. 
The carpenters also own $200,000 of Adams Packing 
Company preferred stock and $150,000 of the same company's 
common stock, which represents lOOf. ownership. In a case 
where a union owns a ccmpany completely, as in this case, 
it would seem that the union shoilld show the .assets ~tt&·Uab11-
o 
ities of the wholly-owned subsidiary either separately or 
in a consolidated statement. In addition. the carpenters 
own $2,000 of Growers Fertilizer Company common stock. 
OPERATIVE ENGINEERS: 
The engineers have llf. of their $12.2 million net 
worth in cash and another 11~ in savings deposits. Nearly 
74f. of their net worth is in u. s. Governments of such short 
maturities that the Carpenters earned only slightly more than 
2~ on their investments in the past few years. The union 
owns common stock valued at $5,000 of the Union Labor Life 
Insurance Company and the great Lakes Supply Company. 
LADIES GARMENT WORKERS: 
The ILGIU has a total net worth of over $165,000,000. 
The international itself has $14 million in net worth, of 
which one million is in cash and 7 million in net u.s. Govern-
menta. The balance sheet of the ILGIU also shows $.2.7 million in 
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collateral loans and three million in •other loans•. Probably 
most of these are loans to other unions. The international 
owns stock in Union Labor Life Insurance company and in several 
radio stations. The ILGwU has pioneered in the principle of 
full disclosure in union financial reporting, and is 
still one of the very few unions which includes in its 
financial report the assets and liabilities of the locals 
aftili a ted with it. At last reports, the local unions con-
nected with the ILGWU had $26.7 million net worth, most of 
which is invested in Government bonds. The international has 
a death benefit fund with assets of.$9.1 miil~on and a start 
retirement fund with assets of over three million. In 
addition, the union ad•inisters employer supported Health, 
Vacation, and Retirement Funds with total net worth of over 
$~13,000,000. While most of this is invested in u. S.Gov-
ernment Bonds, the union has fifteen million dollars in a 
,4.5fo mortgage on a co~perativehousing and slum clearance pro-
jrct and five million dollars in Federal Savings & Loan 
Insurance Corporation insured savings and loan associations. 
HOD CARRIERS: 
Over t5fo of the Hod Carriers $12.6 million net worth 
is invested in bonds, the remaining 5fo is in cash. The bond 
holdings consist of 53fo u. S. Governments and 47fo corporate 
bonds. The corporate bonds are of very high quality; 85fo are 
rated AAA by Moody's and the remaining are AA. The union also 
owns 233 shares ot Union Labor Life Insurance Company and 
two shares of Federal Bank and Trust Company common stock. 
MUSICIANS: 
The American Federation of Musicians has a net 
wor\h of $5,433,225. Almost 2~ of the union's assets are 
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in cash, and the remaining assets, with the exception of 
$120,000 of real estate and a 4~ $200,000 industrial mortgage, 
are invested in U. S. and Canadian Government Bonds. 
IRON WORKERS: 
The Iron 1Vorkers present the ultimate in union in-
vestment conservatism. Nearly 87~ of the union's total assets 
of eleven million dollars is held in cash. It is needless to 
point out how much the union could earn on its funds if they 
were invested in even the most conservative of all possible 
ma:.tme rs. 
MAINTENANCE OF WAY El4PLOYEES: 
The union hEI.s over $7.7 million, in assets. Only 
aboljlt 4~ of these assets are in cash and over 60fo is invested 
in securities. The union also holds real estate valued at 
$676,000. All the .securities are Government Bonds of the U. 
s. and Canada, thus the yield on its investments received by 
the union is only a little over 1~. 
MARITIME UNION: 
The Maritime Union receives a yield on about 2.lfo 
on its investments consisting mainly of U. s. Government Bonds 
(61~) and real estate (26fo). The remainder of the union's 
$5,677,258 total assets are held in cash. 
RAILROAD AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS: 
The Brotherhood has total assets in excess of 
$10,547,000. Rearly $886,500 (or 8.5fo of total assets) is 
held in the form of cash. U. S. Government Bonds account 
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for 761. of the union's assets and Canadian Government bonds 
make up a~ther Sf.. The balance sheet of the union shows an 
investment of $10,000 in common stock, but this is merely a 
holding of a wholly-owned building company of little impor-
tance. The union received a yield of 2.81. on the investments, 
which is rather high for a fund with no holdings of common 
stocks or mortgages. The explanation lies in the fact that 
the bonds owned are mostly long-term issues and several of 
the Canadian issues yield 3f. and over. 
TEAMSTERS: 
The Teamsters have total assets of just under forty 
million dollars, which makes it one of the richest in the 
u.S. Nine per cent of the union's assets are in cash, another 
nine per cent in land and buildings and 76f. in investments. 
The investments, as shown in the union's balance sheet, con-
sist almost entirely of •securities." This figure is not 
broken down, but it appears likely that the Teamsters hold 
some common stock, as well as substantial amounts of various 
corporate bonds. The Teamsters' constitution prohibits the 
investment of more than $50,000 in the bonds of any one 
company. The. Teamsters' investments return a yield of about 
3,3f.. 
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LOCOMOTIYI FIRIMIH AND ENOlNIIII: 
The Bro~herhood holds about 3~ of ~he ~otal asse~s 
01 near~y 3~ mi!~ion dollars in cash. The ba!ance is invested 
in SIICI.u·it.iea of ~he u. s. GoYermen~. S~ate ahd Municipala, 
Canadian bonds, and PUblic Utility Bonde. u. s. Treaaury 
issues account for 33f. of the union•s investments, sta~e and 
MUnicipals make up 22:( ,. canadian IClil'lOB another 3~ and ~he 
remaining 15~ h innsted in PUblic Utility Bonde? The Fire-
men and E&&inee•en receive a yield of 3.06f. on ~hess invest-
menta, which at firs~ glance seem ex~racrdinarily high in 
Tiew of ~he claaaifica~ions of securi~ies owned. A closer 
look a~ ~he inYestmen~s of the union ahows ~hat ita inves~­
ment policy 1a almos~ unbelieYably shor .. siglu.ed. The u. s. 
Treasury and U~ility Bonds appear to be of high quality 
(Yielding 2.67fo and 2.681. respec~ively), t.he Canadian Bonds 
are alae of fairly sood quality (yielding 3.12~). but. t.he 
state and Municipals held demona~ra~e t.hat. the union's inves~­
men~ policy is no~ a sound one. In t.he firs~ glace, such 
securities generally sell at. very low yields because of t.heir 
~ax exemp~ features. Since unions do no~ have to pay ~axes 
on their invea~ment. returns, i~ is foolish for a union to pay 
a premium ~o obtain these bonda. Thus, t.he •n1on, with 22fo 
of i~s asse~a invested in s•ch sec•rities is paying high 
prices for t.he bonds which do no~ afford it any advantages. 
In t.he second place, the particular issues owned by the Fire~ 
aen and Enginemen are of extremely poor quality (as evidenced 
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by the tact that the yield on these holdings is about 3.75~. 
There is no doubt that the union would greatly benefit if 
aa.e of these low-quality municipals were sold, and the funds 
reaulting from their aale inveated in high-grade corporate 
common and preferred stocks, or at least corporate bonds 
MACHIJIISTS: 
The balance sheet of the International Association 
of Machinists shows total assets of nearly $1-4,500,000 
cash holdings account for 3~ of theae assets, u. s. Treas•ry 
Bonds make up 56~, ca nadiau Governaent iSJ¥es ~~ and common 
stocks co~riae 1-4~. The twtl-million plus investment in 
comaon stocks ia put only into aecuritiea which meet the 
requirement• of the Probate court of washington for Estates, 
etc. The •nion thua receives a yield of about 2.65~ on ita 
investments, though a .. all pension fund operated by the 
Machinists, with a higher percentage of its assets invested 
in common stocks, earns well over 3~ annually. 
LOCOMOTIVE ENGIXEiRS: 
The Locomotive Engineers, with total assets of 
almost 20 million dollars, have gone rather heavily into 
FHA inawred mortgages. While the union has 67fo of its assets 
in bonds (U. S· and Vpadian Government and Corporate e), 
L--•"' 
27~ of its assets are in euch mortgages. This is an extreaely 
high percentage for any union. Since an income statement was 
unobtainable, it was impossible to estimate the yield earne(I,,L;: ,,,~ 
by the union. 
STREIT, ELECTRIC & MOTOR COACH IMPLOYEIS: 
As of JllDe 30, lt55, t.be Street,. Electric Railway 
& Motor Coach Elllployees bad total assets of fll,538,000. 
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only $588,112 was in cash and $10,8,3,600 was in investments? 
A~ou~ 7~ of these investment.• consisted of u. s. and Canadian 
GoverDRent Bonds <•t~ in u. s. GoverDRents). The ialance 
sheet. abows t•72,7tl in u. s. sonde other than Govern~~enta-. 
but does not explain what these consist or. The union also 
holds.$20,000 worth of union Laapr Life Insurance caapany common 
stock~ Jlort.l!iases caaprise 2'' of t.he union•s investments. 
)learly 99~ of these are :nu insured. Principally iecause of 
this large mortsage holding, the union receives a )ield of 
a11out 3 •. 1~ on the investments. 
POST OFFICE CLEiXS: 
The Post Office Clerks have over 66{. of their total 
assets of $527,000 invested in securities. They also hold 
$5t,OOO (11:() in cash. The securities held are about 80:( 
bonds and 20:( comapn stockS• The union received a return o~ 
about 5.,:( on its investments in l·~·~ The union's assets are 
actually substantially understated because its stock holdings 
are reported at cost and are now selling at higher prices. 
For exaaple, most of the union's caaaon stock inveataent is 
in coaaonwealth Edison (coat ta2, market $'2.75), General 
Tire & Rubber (cost $33, market $66), Parke Davis (cost $,3, 
market $53), swift & Caapany (cost t•o, market $'8), Inter-
national Harvester (coat $31, market $35,75). Thus it can 
easily be seen that the Post Office Clerks, in addition to 
obtaining an excellent return on their investments have aleo 
made sizeable capital gains. 
POTTERS: 
The International Brotherhood of operative Potters 
has been the most successful uaion in the inveetaent field 
of any ~erican union. This is d•e to the fact that nearly 
80:( of the union•s $5,l76,19t total assets are invested in 
a diversified list of coamon stocks.## Another $503,000 is 
#This is the return on cost. The yield on present market 
value would be somewhat lower. 
##The portfolio of the Potters union is given in Table Vl. 
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inTeate4 in bonds (both goTernment and corpora~e). $227,000 
is in cash and $276,000 is in aaTinca deposits. The union 
ob\ained a yield ot 4.51~ in lt50, 6.03:fo in lt51, 6.02~ in 
1952, 5.27:fo in lt53, and 5.06:fo in lt54. The yield on stocks 
owned was 5.4~ in 1954. In addition, the union made a profit 
ot $113,562 in lt54 on security transactions. The stocks held 
by the union are now selling at prices well above the cost 
price. This means tha~ t.he aaae ts of the union are, like 
those of the Post Office Clerks, actually higher than re-
cprded in the balance aheet. The Potters buy only the stocks 
ot banke, ins•rance companies, and public utilities. The 
success of t.he Pot.tera indicate& the opportunities available 
to any •nion which organizes ita investaent policy. 
c. Stock ownerahip js a Means of corporate control 
We have seen that labor •nions in the united Sta~ea 
are not,, to any great. degree, inveating their funds in caamon 
stocks? The poaeibility that thia policy may be changed, 
however, brings up one of the moat interesting questions in 
the discussion of labor union investment policy, naaely, 
the problem of unions obtaining a voice in manaaement throuch 
common stock ownership. That ie a topic that has received a creat 
deal ot attention in recent months, and one upon which there 
has been a creat deal of controversy, 
The essence of the problem is simple, CCllllmon stock 
ownership carries with it the right to a voice in the manace• 
ment. of the corporation. As unions purchase caamon stock 
they will receive the right to vote for directors of the 
corporations and the right to vote on other issues concerning 
the company. The question tb~ becomes the following: Is 
participation in management, even to the extent of represen-
tation on boards of directors, within the proper sphere of 
activity for a labor union? 
The problem was well stated by Jesse Robinson, when he 
asked: 
There arises the question of a union part1-
cipatill8 in management. decisions? This is diffi-
cult to answer. Should t.he union cast a vote in 
proxy contests? Should it cas~ a vote on ana 
question presented to stockholders? The tra i-
tional union policy is to avoid the responsibil-
ity for manaaement decisions. Some unions that 
hold stock appear at stockholders• meetings and 
present their views on labor-related issues, but 
refrain from voting. On the other handm some 
union officials listen kindly to the idea that 
their holdings may become large enough to jue -
tify representation on the board of directors, 
where they can support the demands of labor in 
any conflict with aanasement.* 
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Most labor leaders who have caamented on this subject 
have denied rather vehemently that they have any intentions of 
seeking to control by common stock ownership firms they bargain 
with· ,;John.L.o. Lewis, although his union is rather deeply in-
volved in the banking business, told visiting West German in-
dustry and labor leaders: 
* 12. 
we don't want responsi)ility of manage-
ment. We want the people who put their •oney 
into it to worry about the problems of .1anage-
ment. and we can help them to decide--at times 
--on matters of policy and principle, without 
being burdened with the responsibility of their 
detailed management problema. If the UMW ~ent 
into the coal business, we wouldn•t be a labor 
union when we were doing it. We'd be another 
competitive commercial enterprise. And the 
policies of the UMW would have to be modified 
to suit the requirements of their financial 
obligations.* 
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Perhaps even more significant is the import of a 
speech made 'by J. scott J.iilne, president of the !BEll which 
has au'bstantial holdings of common stocks, including sizeable 
holdings of the stock of many comjanies with which the IBEW 
baa labor contracts. Mr. Milne stated that: 
It ia the Job of my aaaociates and my 
self ••• to handle our financial affairs in the 
capacity of trustee• and not as leaders of a 
labor organization. It is our definite pol-
icy to continue to represent the members of our 
organization to the 'best of our ability, and to 
protect and increase their funds in order to 
promote their security in their old age, and it 
is not our policy now, nor at any time, to en-
deavor to interfere with .IIIM!&emenh* 
Mr. Milne went on to amplify this statement and gave 
a very interesting analysia of the attitudes of his union 
toward this problem. It is pro'bable that this attitude is 
one that the IBEW shares with the maJority of other unions 
that currently oan, or eventually will own, c011111on stocks. 
our organization will obviously endeavor 
to protect the rights ·.·Gifr : oul!l' members,, but 
it 1a not our policy to uae our· ownership of 
any of our stocks ~o force any action along such 
lines. Any action on that front mua~ be fully 
Justified on its own merits. 
* 38, P• 50. 
**uo, p. e. 
Also ••• if we make an investment in 
any company, •hich, in our opinion, ceases 
to continue proper and efficient manage-
mentm except for unusual conditions, we 
will withdraw and treat this purely on its 
inveataent merita, rather than use it as 
a means of forcing an isaue. 
As stockholders, we are only inter-
ested in getting a fair return on our in-
vestments in order to build up our pension 
funds and keep faith with our members? We 
have no desire to interfere or participate 
fur'Uier in corporation management.* 
'l'he fact Jlhat. should be noted about this atat.ement 
of policy is that the problem of a proxy fight ot widespread 
- ~ -.. ( :, J.. :-; 1- f. i... :~~ ', :-' • ',:•: }_f), • F F' 
st.ockhol4er diesatia·raction with present management has not 
yet come up in any of the coapaniea in which the Electrical 
workers have a common stock investment. Despite the pronounce-
ments of president Milne, it is still impossible to determine 
what the actual reactions of the llectrical workers will ie 
if such a eituation ehould arise. 
Although such statements as the above iy Mr. Milne 
and Mr. Lewis are typical, it should by no means be assumed 
that there is anything approaching unanimity of opinion on 
the part of la'llor leaders conoer .. ing the ques!li on of the prop-
er use of the powers associated with common s10ock ownership. 
Mr. Paul D. Jackson, of the Harbor Carriers Association, in 
a speech before the 19~4 ILA conven~ion argued that: 
If one legitimate goal of trade unionism 
may lie said to inolu•e a larser stall:e::itn.AIDerica 
and a larger voice in mauasementm in what way 
can tha10 ietter be served than by stock purchase 
* 10 I P• s. 
and vownerahip in those corporations wher-e 
union mem\ership desires a larger partici-
pation, possiply through a directorship, in 
business decisions.* 
Benjamin Fairless, president of the united States 
Stea,l CorJ>'oration, has made a statement in a similar vain: 
we have approximately 300,boO em-
ployees •• ~and together they could buy all 
the caamon stock of the corporation by 
purchasing J•st 87 shares apiece ••• •BY in.,.t , 
vesting $10 a weak apiece the employees of 
u. 8. Steel could \uy all the outstanding 
CCIIIIIIon st'ock in leis than seven years.** 
There are cases, as we have seen, where unions have 
gone into business in ca.petition with their employers (as, 
for example, the ILGIU, the Typograph•rs~ and the'optical 
Workers), \ut purchase of common stock for the sake of in-
fluencing management decisions has been virtually non-exist-
ent. Of course, in many cases a union will buy one or more 
shares of common stock of each company with which they have 
bargaining contracts for the purpose of receiving company 
financial reports. The one, case in which there possibly has 
been some attempt to influence mauagement lily the purchase of 
common stock is the much publicized /feamsters-laontgauery 
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ward negotiations of last year. The Teamsters Union was 
trying to negotiate a union shop agreement with the management 
of Montg011ery ward. Several local teamster organizations# 
bought substantial quantities of common stock in Montgomery 
* 36, p. 425. 
** 22, P• 107 
# The organizations involved were the Michigan Conference of 
Teamsters (covering 23 locals and 50,000 members) and the 
Automobile Transp.,~~&ion Association (representing 12,000 
members). 
' 
' I 
\ 
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oommen~ $o~s om the subject apparently felt that 
the stock was purchase for the .Purpose of influencing manage-
ment which was engaged i a fi&ht for control of the corpo-
ration. As Buainesa Week put it: 
The large stockholdin& might give 
the Teamstera more leYerage in trying to 
budge Kontgomery Ward in bargaining--particu-
larly on the union shop, to which Avery is 
firmly opposed.** · 
The Teamsters naturally denied tha~ they had any 
such motivu,, arguing (with considerable j•sdfication that 
the purpose was justified solely on the basis of its invest-
ment merits. J• Howard U:inuich, president of the Red Star 
Transit Company, Detroit, and an employer trustee of the 
welfare fund which purchaaed the stock stated: 
Our purchase is not part of the contro-
versy over control of iii caapany, at least, so 
far as I am concerned. · 
Subsequently, the stock held by the Teamsters was 
voted for management, and manageaent agreed that a union· shop 
contract with the Teamsters union. This does not mean to 
imply that there was any improper use of the union's funds. 
The stock was purchased because it appeared a sound inYestment. 
Since the union was sat.isfied with the present management, 
its shares were voted for management. Of course, .~e new 
bargaining contract negotiated with the company may have had 
# Approximately 1~ of the outstanding stock of the coapany 
was purchased by the union (fl ,000,000). While this seems 
to be a relatiyely small holdin&, it should be noted that 
the largest single holder of Montgomery ward stock (Mass. 
Investment Trust) did not vote its holdings. 
**27, P• 57. ---
***Iii d. 
a lot to do with the union's satisfaction with the Avery 
management. 
Perhaps the most idealistic view taken of this 
situation is that held by Frank Tannenbaum: 
It is only logical that some of these 
funds should be reinvested in the industry 
from which they came •••• It is not likely that 
these new savings institutions, for so the 
unions may be considered, will ever own all 
of modern industry. That is not necessary, 
and perhaps not even aesirable. But in-
creasing ownership is a logical next step •••• 
What is presumed in this development is that 
the union will gradually take on the role of 
the modern corporation by buying into it ••.• 
The corporation and the union will ultimately 
merge in common ownership and cease to be a 
house divided.* 
Thus we see that there is a great deal to be said on 
both sides of this question. There are several people who 
ti1ink union representation on boards of directors would be a 
desirable thing, and there are others who claim that this is 
outside the ephere of proper labor union activity. 
' To a. large <lletent, howeve rJ the problem does not 
really exist at the present time. Total union assets, while 
huge in absolute amount, are still an insignificant fraction 
of the total value of all corporate securities outstanding. 
At the present time it is extremely unlikely that mere than a 
handful of unions could obtain a directorship even if the ma-
jority of their investible funds were devoted to the purchase 
of one company's common stock. But this is not to say that 
this problem will not become a real one as union assets grow 
* 6. p. l88ff. 
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in the next several years. Eventually unions will reach the 
point where a fundamental decision must be made on this 
question. Assuming that unions will devote larger and larger 
p~oportions of their funds to common stock purchase, should 
they or should they not buy stock in companies with which they 
have bargaining contracts? If th~do buy the common:atto.Ok of such 
companies, thus making the union part owner of the enterprise, 
how should they use the rights and privileges that go with corpo-
rate ownership? If enough stock is owned so that a director-
ship is a possibility, should the union take advantage of this 
opportunity? 
These are questions which are impossible to answer 
in a definite fashion at the present time. No matter what 
union officials may say now, the fact remains that the problem 
has never really come up, and when it does it will be one to 
which union leaders will have to give serious thought. 
VI4 Evaluation of Union Investment Policy 
A< Conservatism of Union Investments 
Most of the union managements, as we have seen, 
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are standing firmly by their conservative policy of concen-
tration in Government bonds. By pursuing such a conservative 
policym there are two principal effects to the ~ion funds. 
First, unions are losing a considerable ·amount of income on 
their investment funds and, sil.coru1i:Alb.eCJmians !'-ro notipro.i;:. 
tecting their funds against a shrinlcage; in buying power 
through a price inflation. 
It is Q:b,>DtJu.s that unions could secure a much higher 
yield on their funus if they followed a less conservative 
investment policy. The present yield received by American 
labor unions on their investments is under 2~fo. A policy which 
included the purchase of sound corporate preferred and common 
stocks would raise the average yield substantia'lly. Even 
at the present time, with common stocks prices at an all time 
high, there are many sound stocks available furnishing 
yields of 5fo or more. In the case of pension funds, it has 
been estimated that an increase of one per cent in yield would 
make possible an increase in benefit payments of approximately 
!ill) lrQ €© per cent. 
The problem of inflation is perhaps an even more 
compelling reason for union leaders to look to equity 
securities as an investment medium. Most economists look 
forward tliOlflnlong term inflationary trend in this country. 
If this is the case in the future, as it has been in the past, 
uhions wi t.h all their funds invested in securities yielding 
a fixed monet. return will find t.hat. the return t.o real terms 
(what. the money return will buy) will decline. To a union 
m .. ber who is planai~ t.o live after retirement on benefits 
received from union retirement. funds this problem is of the 
utmost. pract.i cal importance. 
There are very few financial organization~ which 
have even approximately the same invesuneut. problems as unions. 
Bank and insurance companiew have legal restrictions on \heir 
.investments. Trust. f..:nds,l1kewise, are regulated. Invest-
ment. companies are less restricted in their investment policy, 
but they face the eonstant problem of trying to sell shares 
t.o the ~blic, thus there is strong pressure on them to be 
fully invested at all times, regardlees of market. condij.ions. 
The only sizeable funds which have the relative freedom of 
union funds as far as investments are concerned, as well as 
the peculiar tax status of unions,are thQse in college and 
university endowaent. funds. Trustees of these funds in 
recent years have come to realize the advantages of common 
stock invest.ment., and now all sizeallle investment funds have 
su'bst.allt.ial:JJort.ions of their aeset.s invested in common 
stocks* These provide the dual function of yielding a 
higher return than is o'bt.ainable by a program of 10~ bond 
* Sec. 8 and p, p. 1•7. 
investment, and provide as good a hedge as possible against 
the almost inevitable encroachment of inflation on the real 
value of the funds. 
naturally, investment in common stocks involves 
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more "risk" than is involved in the policy of Governments only 
or even bonds only. However, there are several ways of 
minimizing theee risks. one of theee methods of reducing 
riek is the eimple principle of diversification, which is 
open to the inveetor with large funds to invest. In addition 
to thie there are several formula plane that have been de-
vised to cope with this proalem. • Formula timing provides a 
method of investment in common stocks which minimizes 
what is proiably the greatest risk in common stock investment; 
the "Psychological • risk.* Theee plans require the admin-
ietrati on of the fund to purchaee or sell eecuri ties at 
certain times in the stock price cycle, Formula plans of vari-
ous typee. 
dollar plan. 
Among the aoet common are, first, the constant 
In this type of plan the same dollar amount 
ie always kept. invested in etocks, ae stock prices increase.u 
the trustee& are compelled to sell stocks, and as prices 
fall, they are coapelled to buy etocks. Other plans involve 
a constant ratio between stocks and bonds. This means that. 
a set percentage of the total assets of t.he fund are invested 
in common stocks. The working of the plan is similar to 
* 4, p •. 5. 
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the fir at in that it encourages investment in stocks when they 
are selling at lotrt,prices, and diacourages common stock 
purchasers after a long riae in the market., when, historica!ly, 
such inves tm,ent has always been unprof'i table. A third type 
of plan is one involving a variable stock-bond ratio, uaually 
tied to the Dow-Jonea Index, or some similar guide. unaer 
this type of' plan the proportion of' stocks and bonds held 
varies according to the position of' the index used. As 
the index climbs, the per cent of stocks held declines 
and as the market declines, the per cent of the stocks is 
increased. 
on a less formal level, the familiar principle of' 
dollar averaging is very well suited to union inves.ments. 
International unions receive a fairly regular monthly income. 
Under such a program, the union would invest a certain amount 
of' its monthly receipts in comwon stocks. '!his investment 
of a fixed amount of money at. regular intervals assured the 
union of' buying more shares of stock when prices are low than 
when prices are high. This plan, when carried on with a 
proper policy of' diversification will assure the union's 
faring \etter than the stock averages. 
An involved technical description of' the workings 
of these plans is beyond the scope of this work. An ex-
cellent. description of the different plans in common use 
today will be found ir. Lucile Tomlinson's Successful Invest-
ing rerrmulas. 
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S~ill Qwher arrangements !or common stock purchase 
are possible •• For example, the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical worke~s puts all returns from its common stock 
investments in excess o! 4% in a reserve fund to serve as 
a cuahion for ponible declines in stock prices. This is 
similar to the P9licy follow.ed by a !ew insurance companies, 
notably New Engl~d Mutual, in buying lower grade corporate 
bonds and setting \lp a reserve account. which i e credited with 
•he excess o! return on these bonds over what. the company 
would receive from high-grade bonds. 
The following chapter will discuss in more detail 
how unions could ,change their present. investment policy so 
as to take advant~e of the benefits of common stock owner-
ship. 
B. Reasons for union Conservation 
There appears to be little understanding outside 
or labor circles of the reasons for present union investment 
policy. There are reasons, and, from a union manager's 
viewpoint.m very good reasons for this policy. In order to 
fairly criticize union investment. policy•• we must have some 
understanding of these reasons. It. is only if we can show 
that these reasons are not. valid for today that we have 
any right. ·•o say tha• unions should change their investment 
policy. 
one important reason for present conservatism on 
the part o! the mtnagers of union investment funds is the 
tact that t.he uni
1
ons suffered heavily in the collapse of 
1929-1933. Many unions caught the speculative fever of the 
20's, and many went after "bankers" profi t.s. or 36 union 
banks precrash, only four surpived. Bonds, mortgages, and 
stocks likewise proved unsuccessful recept.acles for funds. 
The banks folded J'at as unemployment ~ocketed, member~hip 
dues declined, and:the unions needed their full resources. 
Leaders of ~erican labor unions are most~y older 
men, particularly fn the wealthier A:rL int..rnationals. 
These men rememher the bad days in the past and fear a 
repetition. In fa~t, it is these same men who were mainly 
instrumental for i~poaing the constitutional limitations 
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on their union's i~vestment. policy which are now tying t.he 
hands of those who would like to liberalize union investment. 
policy. 
As Professor Belfer has pointed out: 
I 
The record of Labor's previous failures 
in buaimelts act.tviUearhas:tundoubt.~dl;, done 
much to conJince labo~ leaders that hhey 
should confine their activities to collective 
bargainint ••• a subject in which they are 
expert.• • *, 
It is not a persuative argument with most union 
officials and members. that, by following a government's only 
policy, they are lolling a golden opp.ortuni ty to increase 
income and profits. They will tell you, "The unions are not. 
in business to make !IIOney, • and t.hey are right. Funds which 
t.hey collect and hol
1
d are a trust.; their first essential is 
* 11, p. 347. 
L' 
'19 
to conserve them. It is better, they say, for them to get 
2 to 2~ on Governments than to seek higher income, with the 
risk involved in corporate bonds and stocks. The outstanding 
i 
exponent of this policy is, as ·u have seen, the ma.w it'el!are 
and Re~irement ~nd. Of the more than $90,000,000 in total 
assets, over 60 million ·NaB in short and long term Governments, 
six million was represented by loans to UMW hospitals, and 
the remaining 27 million dollars was in checking and savings 
accounts. The results of this altra-conservative policy were 
that the UKW earn abou• 2.4~ on their investments. Even 
this is higher than the •olUlt eilmed:·by.lllany other unions, 
such as the Auto Workers who showed only a 1.2~~ return on 
their investments in their last fiscal year. 
As pointed out be!orem Taft-Hartley, the trend 
toward arbitration of wage demands, and improved mechanism 
within unions for settling jwrisdictional disputes, c9uld 
lead to a continuing improvemsntiin the time-lost-through-
strikes picture. The significance to Union treasuries has 
already been pointed out. General funds, special. funds, and 
reserves will continue to grow, unless there is a deep 
recession in iusiness. As long as these funds continue to 
grow, the general membership of the unions will continue to 
be satisfied with the handling o! their organiza.ion•s finan-
cial resources. 
The bricklayers, !or example, have little reason to 
be discontented with the financial progress of their union. 
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Net worth of the rnterna~ional union of Bricklayers, Masone, 
and Plasterers has increased in ten years from less tnan ten 
million dollars to more than 17 million dollars in 1954, The 
bulk of its investments are in united States and canacUam 
Government Bonds, and Municipal Bonds. The Steelworkers 
have increased their net worth by almost twenty million dol-
lara in the one yearm 1955. 
As long as this growth continues it is likely ~hat 
union members will be favorably impressed with the financial 
results obtained by their officers, and thus there will be 
no incentive on these grounds to change investment policy. 
This attitude towards investments is summed up in 
a statement Ill ade by Willi am F. Schtli tzler, Secretary-Treasurer 
of the AF of L: ·"We are JW.tin the money business. If we 
get \be interested in Wall Street, we are likely to forget 
the jolD we were elected to d~?·* The Secretary-Treasurer of 
the CIO had made acme similar pEonouncements. Mr. James B. 
Carey las~ year suated that, •we have never bad the slightest 
taint of scandal ~n connection with CIO Fundsm and maybe one 
reason we haven't is that we have stayed out of the stock 
market business.•** 
Another reason for the conservatism of union invest-
mente is to lDe in the chatacteristics of the union lead-
* 
** 
23, p. 82. 
Ibid. 
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who have risen to their high~osition through a series or 
political and economic s t.rliggles. A knowledge or imeat.aent 
markets is not now, and never·bail 'llleen, a prerequisite for 
union leadership. Nevertheless, as unions grow in financial 
strength and power, t.he leadership discovers that. it has 
suist•llliial funds. at its disposal. 'nleir union experience 
has not prepared them specifically for the task of wise in-
vestment of their fQnds. It is thus unusual to find in top 
union financial positions individuals who have a keen under-
standing of the money and securities markets and of the sub-
tleties of the government bond market. Often men in charge 
of the investment of union funds are selected because of 
their loyalty and devotion to the union and not because of 
their knowledge of invea~ment. opportunit-ies. 
out: 
In addition, as an authority has recently pointed 
It is a hard fact that, if the inter-
national officials who have ccme up through 
the ranks of laior by virtue of their organ-
ization abilit.y and leadership capacity gen-< 
erally are not trained or experienced at the '. 
business of investing, local officials who 
often spend their days in the shops and their 
nights on union business are even less spphts-
ticated about investments and have less time 
to give to fund management.* 
Since most union financial officers are not exper-
ienced in the securities field!> the selection of Goverment 
bonds only, relieves them of the responsibility of exercizing 
* 12 • 
• 
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any par~icular Judg811ent on ~he seJ.ect.ion of investment". 
Although tuese inuividuals ar~ nominally responsible for the 
prudent. inves~men~ of union funds, they cannot actually be 
cri ti ciaed by the membership of: t.he union it they stick to a 
Government. only policy. Who would ilame them if Treasury 
Bonds bough~ at. par decline to the low 90•s or if the price 
l~vel rises so that. t.he real value of their reserves deter-
iorates or even if the poor quality municipal bond (selec~ed 
'tie cause it yields a hi ghar return than any U. S• Goverillllent 
issue default.e,? On the other handm they .may be accused of 
speculating it a carefully selected list of blue-chip common 
stocks drops only a few per cen~ from cost. Moreover, 
adainia~ering union funds ia not a full time job in most 
cas"•· Union managers do not have t.he time (even if they did 
have the ability and experience) t.o stuuy security values, 
select. appropriate securities, and maintain the con~inuo~s 
supe.vision that the professional knows is essential to 
successful diversified inveat.ing. 
This problem is intensified by the fact that unions 
have a distrust. of financial institutions and personnel 
becauae these inati tut.ions nave frequently been allied with 
anti-union forces. This distrust makes it difficult for 
union officials to seek ccmpet.ent advi~e about investment 
programs. Kany union leaders wo~ld tind the idea of consult-
ing a broker or investment advisor about the proper invest.-
~ent of their tunds repugnant to tnemselves. 
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Thus the policy of investing in government securities 
only is simple and •safe.• such a policy requires no special 
investment staff or financial •know-how. 11 The union leader 
doesn'~ have to concern himself with the invesl.lll•n-t. Problem. 
Another important reason for union conservatism 
lies in the legal restrictions on union financial activities. 
In this case the legal restrictions are not imposed by 
government authorities but by the unions themselces, The 
majority of unions have written into their constitutions, 
provisions which limit the investments of union funds, 
generally to government and municipal securities. A few 
unions have recently eased these restrictions, others are 
planning to, and a few others are reinterpreting the re-
strictions in a more liberal manner. 
Still another reason offered for the avoidance of 
common stock ownership lies in the problems that could arise 
from unions owning stock of firms within which the union aas 
a bargaining contract. Many unions, as has been pointed out 
earlier, own token amounts of stock in all the firms with 
which they have collective bargaining contracts. This is 
principally for the purpose of receiving financial reports 
and the right to be heard at annual meetings of the company. 
When unions own more than a token amount of stock in these 
companies, serious policy problems can arise. Most labor 
leaders disapproved of the Teamsters purchase of Montgomery 
Ward stock last year, on llhe basis that this was done only 
to influence management decisions in regard to employment 
policies. Even in cases, however, where the union does not 
specifically purchase securities for this purpose, the mere 
fact that a union holds stock in a company which is involved 
in a dispute of some sort (labor or otherwise) can have 
serious consequences. Let us assume that a labor union 
holds a substantial number of shares in a particUlar corpo-
ration. Suppose, further, that the company should become 
involved in a dispute over control of the corporation. The 
union's decision on which faction should be supported in a 
proxy fight would depend to a great extent on which group 
would be willing to give the union the best contract, or 
which group had the best record of good labor relations. 
Many unions feel that they do not want to get 
involved in proxy fightsm or even take advantage of the 
limited management functions that attend common stock owner-
ship. The converse results of such a situation is possible: 
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if an international invests in companies with which it bar-
gains, will its stockholder position undermine its primary 
concern with wage rates and working conditions? Some union 
executives are fearful that· it might, or that they might be crit.-
}i·Ua.,Q: unfairly on that score by the membership if they 
do not make as good a deal as some members want. Union 
leaders are naturally very sensitive about the possibility of 
such criticism. Therefore, they conclude that it is wiser to 
avoid the problem by avoiding common stock purchases. 
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Another reason for union conservatism that is fre-
quently stressed by union officials is the great need for 
liquidity in union funds. They concede that the union's funds 
may be idle for long periods and not needed, but, they claim, 
there may be t~mes when all the union's resources would be 
needed in a relatively short period. They also argue that 
the financial strength of a union as far as bargaining and 
weathering a strike is concerned, is measured as much by the 
liquidity of the union's funds as by their absolute amount. 
If a contract expires, the employer is less likely to grant 
advantageous terms to the union if he knows that the union 
cannot afford a strike. The threat of a strike is labor's 
chief weapon in any bargaining dispute. A union whose assets 
are tied up in investments which cannot be quickly or advan-
tageously converted into cash is not in any position to 
weather a prolonged strike. With the present situation in 
regard to union financial reports what it is (that is, now 
as never before, employers can have up-to-qate knowledge of 
the state of union finances), the unions must maintain a 
highly liquid position in order to maintain a strong Position 
at the bargaining table. 
The cost of a strike to a union is surprisingly 
large. Even with very little support given to str~kers, a 
s~utdown of work in a plantm or an industry, involving, say 
10,000 men for a period of three months "would be staggering 
to the union's treasury--a million dollars would be quickly 
disbursed."* The million dollars, while a substantial sum 
for even the wealthiest of unions, would be no more than 
pocket money to the striker, not real supper~. It would 
provide about $33 to each striker per month for a strike 
lasting three months.· And Support of the strikers is, it 
should be noted, generally only one item in heavy costs 
that a strike of any magnitude necessarily involves. 
86 
Since unions realize that their fundamental purpose 
1s the securing of higher wages and improved working con-
ditions for their members, and not the accumulation of vast 
sums of money, they are very •ware of this situation. Union 
leaders are more interested in successfully carrying out the 
jobs they were elected to do than increasing the yield on 
their investments. They feel that a highly liquid position 
is a necessity in trying to successfully function as the 
collective bargaining agents of their constituents. 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of 
common stocks is that they fluctuate widely in the market 
price. A union with a heavy investment in common stocks may 
find that it is forced to sell these holdings just at the 
time when sound investment policy may dictate the addition of 
common stock to their holdings. Thus, a union with common 
stock holdings could t1nd that its investment objectives and 
*Eric Peterson, General Secretary, International Association 
of Machinists (quoted in 13, p. 359), 
87 
policies could come into conflict with its collective bar-
gaining aims. For this reason, many unions reject entirely 
the concept of common stock investment for their funds. 
To some extent, of course, union thinking along 
these lines is perfectly correct. The objective analyst, 
however, cannot help but be struck with the thought that 
unions are overdoing this need for liquidity. There seems 
to be little justification for a union to hold 15 or 20 
per cent of its total assets in checking accounts. Short 
term Treasury Bills, especially during the past year , would 
have provided a safe, liquid investment outlet for these funds 
which would provide a substantial yield. Unions with fifteen 
or twenty million dollars in their treasury are certainly 
within the bounds of reasonable safety if they invest a small 
percentage of their holdings in common stock, which, in 
addition to giving a greater yield to the union, will also 
serve as a hedge against the inflationary tendencies in our 
economy. Moreover, this need for liquidity certainly does 
not exist in the welfare, vacation, and retirement funds 
administered by the unions. In these funds the managers 
should consider all the risks attendant to investing large 
sums of money, and, in the light of present day government 
fiscal and monetary policy, the risk of inflation is of 
prime importance. 
The extremes to which unions desire liquidity can 
be shown by an example cited by Professor Belfer. He related 
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the case of a union which secured an employer financed 
vacation fund into which the employer made contributions 
each week. Disbursements from this fund were made only 
during the summer. The funds were deposited in a checking 
account, and, Belfer reports, it was "impossible to convince 
the treasurer that the funds should be invested in Treasury 
Bills."* 
There is one final reason why international unions 
do not invest to any great extent in common stocks. This is 
the fact that, by confining tf,l5 investments to Government 
Bonds, the international sets a standard for the locals. 
That is, the locals, seeing the international investing its 
funds in Governments only, follows the same policy. The 
internationals, with millions of dollars in their treasuries, 
could easily affor-. to hire expert investment advisors. 
Locals, many of whom have only tiny assets as compared with 
the internationals, generally could not affoed such a service. 
Once the international buys stocks, then, even though it may 
be guided by expert advisors, it releases the locals, which 
through innocence of investment techniques, may not use the 
same caution and judgement shown by their international 
office has invested in common stocks, may decide that he 
should do the same. His investments, however, are almost 
* 11, p. 348. 
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sure to be less well-"advised than the international stock 
purchases. As one writer has put it: 
One of the _probl~ms that a few 
union leaders have faced in the effect 
that any change in investment policy 
by the international will hav:e on ·' 
the constituent districts, chapters, 
and locals. How much their aggregates 
are is anyone's guess, with ~ome 
guesses running to $3 million or more, 
without benefit of pension or welfare 
funds. 
If one speaks to an international 
official about the' finances of the locals, 
it becomes apparant that this is a sensitive 
situation. Where treasury funds are con-
qenae~ned every unit is autonomous and in-
tends to remain sO. Any effort to~i~ 
policy f'rom above is likely to elicit curt 
rejection, Suggestion--yes;direction--not* 
This is a valid reason, if not overestended, for 
'i ·, :t ~·· . ' ·- .. . ; ; . 
international unions to be uLtraconservative in their invest-
ment policies, 
Thus we can see that there are many explanations for 
the conservatism of union investment policy. A few of these 
are valid reasons why a union, beca4se of its peculiar 
characteristics should avoid equity securities. Most of 
them, however, appear to be greatly overworked by union 
J!..eadera,,. and, on balance, it seems hard to avoid the con-
elusion that union leaders have an irrational distrust of 
financial institutions and a more rational but exaggerated 
desire to play safe. 
The only ~onclusion that can fairly be drawn from 
an analysis of union investment policy and the reason for it 
is that it is extremely unrealistic and has little to commend 
* 12. 
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itself in the light of U. s. fiscal and debt-management 
> 
policles, and that it offers little or no compensation for 
the decline of the purchasing power of the dollar as ex-
' 
per1enced in recent years. 
VII. Possible Solutions to the Problem 
we have seen that the problem of union investment 
policy is an important one, and that as union treasuries 
grow in future years the problem will become more serious. 
What type of solution can we expect to this problem? Will 
unions realize that they have an obligation to their members 
to protect their funds from the dangers of inflation as well 
as de pression? 
It seems likely that certain basic feelings of 
union leads rs cannot be changed in the near future. We can 
not expect unions to invest heavily in common stocks because 
of their strong desire for liqui_dity, and their fears of 
setting an improper example for the locals, not to mention 
the distrust which union officials have of many financial 
institutions. 
91 
Recently we have seen that--there has been some 
improvement in the situation. The Machinists only recently 
concluded that a modest position in equalities may provide a 
sound qedge against long-term inflation, which most union 
leaders accept as inevitable. This 15~ of the Machinists 
assets which are invested in common stocks ar• confined to 
issues approved by the District of Columbia Probate Court for 
investment by estates and trusts. The union's advisor on 
its investments is the local office of a national brokerage 
concern. 
Some unions that have decided on a stock position 
have solved the problem of choice of securitie& by buying 
into a mutual fund. Barron's recently reported that, "A 
recent. survey of the National Association of Investment 
Companies revealed that labor unions have 33 mutual fund 
accounts, aggregating $887,000."* 
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This investment in mutual fund shares is more char-
acteristic of local unions and small internationals than of 
the larger internationals. 
One west Coast local invests $17,000 every month 
in a large balanced fund. Small pension plans are doing the 
same thing. On the other hand, a large Washington internat-
ional recently took into its own employ the broker whose 
advice it had been following. The investment companies with 
large union accounts are Fidelity Fund, Incorporated Investors, 
and Massachusetts Investors Trust.** 
The unions have come a .logs way from the days of 
the cash box. Continued accumulation of funds in the hands 
of unions and their institutions steadily intensifies the 
serious problem of investment. There is some evidence of 
their slow trend from the traditional reliance on Government 
bonds and in the direction of equities. The labor unions, 
therefore, present a great challenge to banks, investment 
advisors, individual economists and security analysts, com-
mission brokerage houses and mutual fund managers, who can 
* 19, p. 40. 
**11 • p. 340 • 
logically be expected to help them steer a safe course in 
waters strange to them. But, if the analyst or investment 
manager hopes to accelerate and share in this trend, he 
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must visualize the problems as they appear to union leaders. 
He must realize that labor leaders are not particularly fond 
of Wall Streeters as a class. Consequently, the investment 
expert cannot approach this group with only the statistics, 
charts, and arguments that would persuade other institutions 
and individual investors. He must consider and understand 
the union official's responsibility to the membership, the 
many varied purposes for which the funds are accumulated, and 
the basic function and primary purpose and interests of labor 
unions. With a sympathetic and intelligent understanding of 
this new and different client, special techniques and mechan-
isms for investment may be developed and accepted--with the 
possibility of a profound influemce on the labor unions, the 
investment markets, and the e.Qonomy as a whole. 
What then, are the possible solutions which might 
be suggested by investment advisors to handle this unique 
situation? Perhaps the most obvious, aai indeed one of the 
best, would be the one that was pointed out earlier in this 
chapter--investment by international and local unions in open-
end investment companies. 
The rapid growth of mutual funds in recent years 
reflects the .t~tages they offer to the individual investor 
and to many financial institutions and .funds. These same 
advantages would hold in the case of anion invea\ment. 
~ong the advantages of inves~nt in a mu~ua! 
fund are ita advantages in solving the problema of (1) 
proper selection of securities, (2) diversification, and 
(3) ~iming. Selection of securities is a difficult jo): 
Proper anal7ais takes time, requires 
acceaa to specialized statistical informa-
tion, and requires the a)ility to interpret 
this information. This can ~est be done ~Y 
an experienced analyst trained in economics, 
t~nance, and accounting as well as in prac-
ttcal experience, With tbe beat of tools 
and training and geod judgement, proper ee-
curHtt selection ia at.ill no easy t.aak; 
without them it is virtually impossible.* 
,, 
M1 investment compaJ11 ll.l&r•satea investment funds 
comtributed )y many investors, It is thus aile to reinvest 
these funds "in a wide variety of other companies, (thus) 
the investor secures adequate diYersificat.ion and careful 
selection.•* The invea~ent ccapany also otters to the 
union the advantage of professional opinion in regard to the 
timing of security purchases. •Investors may queatiou the1r 
own aiility to time their purchases properly, but they may be 
willing to have the skilled management ot an investment com-
pany time their securi t.y purchases and aale.s. •*** 
Moreover. because ot the diversification efterea. iy 
the •• taal fund, such an investment. offer- t.he iest. means 
aTaikable to t.a. union to follow· a dollar-averaging or form-
* 3, P• ... 
** IUd. 
*** '3'";li. no • 
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ula-t.iming program •. 
There is still another advantage to a union in 
purchasing the shares of open-end investment companies. The 
survey made by the Na\iona~ 4ssociation of Inves\•ent Com-
panies ..eferred to altove pointed out ~ohis fact which is of 
great importance to union leaders: 
rt should i~ noted thaw own~rship of 
mutual fund shares, in contrast to direc~ 
o .. nership of equity aecuri ties of a company 
with which a labor union has a labor con-
tract involves uo possi'llili ty or. company con-
trol and, therefore• poses no conflict with a 
union's partisan interests ••• (The) union's 
interes~o in a company, or group of companies, 
whose securitiea are included in a mutual fund 
held iy ~be union, ia purely an economic one.* 
Because of all the altove advantages, it appears •o 
this oltaerver that a program of systematic tnvestmen\ in the 
shares of a suitaltie open-end investment company would be a 
wise method by which unions could .raise the return on thei1· 
f~ds, and olttain some degree of protection frcm the long-
term inflationary trend in the u. s. economy. Such a program 
should not lte considered a dereUction of duty on the part 
of the individuals responsible for the administration of the 
union's funas. In turning over the management of a portion 
of their funds to the managers of ~he mutual fund, the union 
managers are otill retaining control over the funds. An 
important point that. should lte made in regard to this is the 
re.latively recent recognition bJl trustees and by courts ~hat 
* 19, p. 40. 
inves.t.lllent c.ompanies are aaU.at.act.ory invest.llent outlets for 
trust funds. After the Annual »eeting of the Probate Judges 
of lla.ssachuaetta in U48, Judas Dillon reported: 
It was the unanimoua feeliug that the 
Probate Judges of this st.at.e, to keep altreas:t 
of the times, should recognize the fact that 
such purchase& (ahares of inveswnent compa -
nies) are not. such a del~gation of authority 
on the part. of the trusteesas would warrant 
an obJection on that. score alone •* 
Similar cleoisions have 1Jeen made in New York, Ohio 
and sev~ral other a~atea. This recpgnition of investment 
companies as a proper inveat.llent for trustees indicates that 
each an inves i.ment !ijp.ould .. -ltyc.no: .• eans be, consid•red. improper 
on the part. of the adminiatrator of a union fund. 
While such a progr811 would be a grea~ improT.elllent 
on present union investment policy, there is still one possible 
measure which unions could adopt which would be superior to 
inves..ment in existing open-end investment companies, this 
would lte the estaltlishment of an open-end inves ..ment company 
by the unions themselves, The recent unification of the 
Anerican Federat~on of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
organizations makes such a prosrsm pract.ical for the first. 
time in the history of the ~erican .labor movement. The 
ofticfrs of the AFL-CIO feaeration could organize such a 
fund~ Each union in t.he country could buy shares in the 
investment c~pany thus formed to whatever extend it thought 
* 3. p. 451. 
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desirable, and con~inue ~o buy according ~o l~s receip~s 
some o~her sys~ema\ic program. Since such a fund would 
presumably be ex~remely large in dollar amount, it could 
afford ~o hire "he bes~ in managerial talent available to 
supervise ~he purchases and sales of securities by the fund. 
This fund, in addi \1 on ~o providing a recep~acle for the funds 
of ~he in~ernationals, •ould provide an inves ..ment outle~ 
which would be sui table for the inves 1.111en~ funds of the locals. 
The locale would ~hus be get.t.ing the. advan~agee of cc.mon 
s\ock ownership and still not be forced to rely on the inex-
perienced and un~rained local union officials to determine 
investment qualities bfo.ilae ::aua,!Jredi~-:upon·,hundreds of ava11-
a8le stocks and bonds. 
If such a mutual fund were established by ~erican 
labor unions, ~he problem of vo~in~ ~ue ~vocK accwa~~a~ea 
migu~ pnr~euu "'erious po.1.1cy proDJ.ems l&S •eJ.J. as ~one po16-
sl01J.l uy ot being accusea oi unra1r specuJ.at.lon because or 
~ne lnsioe inrorm·a~ion avaiJ.abJ.e abou.~ .. ne course or cou~or·ac~o 
uiiiii.Ouia~lonsJ. ;;,ucn a pr·ooJ.em couJ.d eas1.1.y oe avoulea or a~ 
J.eas~o grea~ly minimizea, ho•ever.. The f~nd would presumably 
hire \rained investment advisors to administer the resources 
of the fund. To elimina~e the problem ·that. could arise 'lihen 
~he fund owns sizeable por~ions of the stock of companies 
with which one of the member unions negotia~es, these inves~­
ment experts cou4d be given comple~e control over the voting 
of the stock in the fund. The stock would then be voted 
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according to the opinions of these securities experts as to 
which candidates or slate of candidates or policies are moat 
bwnwficial fraa an investment point of view. 
Such a program, if adopted by the unions, would 
have important reperc•asion~ on the rest of the economy. 
The additional funds invested in the stock market, for ex-
ample, would add millions to the demand for stocks and, in 
addition, add needed depth to a market that, even with the 
hi&hest volume in recent years, is strikingly thin,# More-
over, such a progr11111 as the one sketched above, if success-
ful, could result in union's demanding a greater voice in the 
administration of pensiqn and welfare funds now adainiltered 
by employers or non-union trustees. It could lead to a 
trend away from the insured pension plans to uninsured, 
union adninistered plans, Thus if the plan is successful 
we can expect it to grea~ly influence labor-management nego-
tiations concerning pensions, welfare, vacation and other 
"fringe" benefits. 
VIII. Conclu\ions 
The main points made in \his paper can be summed 
up briefly as follows: 
1) American laior unions have enjoyed in recent 
years a period ot grea\ growth in membership 
2) In the near future, union membership will 
probably be s\aiilized at or near present 
levels. 
3) The endof \he need for sizeable organizing 
expenses and \he probable decline in work 
stoppages due to laior disputes will result 
in a rapid and lonslastlng growth in \he total 
amount of,funds in union \reasuries, 
4) These funds already amount to over fSOO,OOO,OOO 
in the treasuries of the international unions. 
The local ~ions probably have at least a 
billion dollars more~ In addition, the welfare 
and direct control saount to close to five 
billion dollars. Pension funds under union 
control are almost certainly well in excess o! 
one billion dollars. 
5) The huge size of funds under union control, and 
the likelihood that the amount will greatly 
increase in the near future makes the problem 
of labor union investment policy a vi tal one to 
everyone interested in la&or and financial 
fields. 
6) At present, union investment policy is extremely 
conservative, relying almost entirely on govern-
ment bonds as an investment outlet, and ignoring 
almost completely the opportunities and advan• 
tages attaching to COIIlllion stock ownership •. ·.This 
present investment policy is restricti~g labor 
uni one to yields muem. lower than is necessary, 
and affording no protection against the encroach-
~ent of !~flation or the real value ~ the funds 
in their possession. 
7) There are some slight eigne of a movSIIent away 
fraa the traditional reliance on Government 
Bonds and in the direction of equities as an 
investment outlet for union funds. There is 
however, no evidence of union desire for control 
100 
or voice in manage!llent affairs by common li'l.ock 
purchase. 
e) There are several reasons offered by union 
leaders tor their tradi,Uonal conservative 
policy, but a closer exaaination reveals 
that mpst ot these reasons have only lim-
ited validity. · 
i) one or the possible solutions to this problem 
is the purchase or shares in open-end invest-
ment companies. so as to receive •he benefits 
ot common stock ownership. It was pointed out 
that several local uniona already have accounts 
with mutual funds. 
10) A better solution would be the formation or an 
open-end investment company financed completely 
with the funds ot international and local 
unions. The recent unification or the AF or L 
and CIO has made such a plan a pracl.ical one 
for the tirsv tiae in labor union history. The 
funQ thus estalalished would be large enough to 
olltain any desira4 amount or diversification, 
":vailld wbuld:. alsOJ lae able to afford t.he best in 
professional advic~. Naturally, there are sev-
eral technicalities that would have to be 
worked out before such a plan could be put into 
operation, but it is my firm belief that the 
establishment of a mutual fund such as that de-
scribed in the previous chapter would be the 
beat way for unions to solve the present and 
future problem of what to do with their tre'* 
aendous and growing assets. 
J 
Taltle IV 
unions Included .b1 This V»dY*# 
Autaaoltil•, Aircraf~ & Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America, United (CIO) 
Automobile workers of America, united (AFL) 
Bakery & Confectionery workers• International Union of 
America (AFL) 
J.Ol 
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders & Helpers, International 
Brotherhood of (AFL) 
Bookbinders, International Brotherhood of (AFL) 
soot. and Shoe workers• Union (SFL) 
Bricklatera, Masons & Plasterers International Ubi on of 
America (AFL) 
Bridse·& Struc~ural Iron Workers, International Aasocian 
of ~.AFL) 
Building Service Employees• International Union (AFL) 
carpenters & Joiners of America, united Bro~herhoo• of (AFL) 
Cement, Lime & Gypsum Workers International Union, united (AFL) 
Chemical Workers union, Int.erna~ional (AFL) 
Cisarmakers• International union of America (AFL) 
Clot.hins Workers of America, Amalgamated (CIO) 
communications Association, American (CIO) 
communications workers of America (CIO) 
Electrical, Badio & Machine Workers International Union (Inf.) 
Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of Aaeric~n united (CIO) 
H * This includes all unions for which financial statements 
or ~etters explaining their investment policy were 
obtained. 
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Electrical Workers of America, International Brotherhood of 
(AFL) 
Engineers, International Union of Operating (AfL) 
Fire Fighters, International Association of (AFL) 
roreman•s Association of America (Ind.) 
Furniture Workers of ~erica, United (CIO) 
Ganaent Workers• Union, International Ladies• (AfL) 
Glasa Bottle Blowers Association of the u. s. & canada (AFL) 
Glass11. Ceranic & Silica Sand Workers of Allleri ca, Federation 
of (CIO) 
Glass Workers Union of North ~erica, Alllerican Flint (AFL) 
Ha~ters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union, United 
(AFL) 
Hod carriere•, Building and Caamon Laiorers• Union of Alllericam 
International (AFL) 
Hotel & Restaurant Employees• International Alliance & Bar-
tenders• International League of America (AFL) 
Lathers, Interna~ional union of wood, Wire, & Metal (AFL) 
Hosiery Workera, American Federation of (CIO) 
La•ndry Workers• International Union (AFL) 
Leather Goods, Plastic & Novelty.Workers, International (AFL) 
Letter carriers Associat.ion, Nat.ional Rural (Ind.) 
LithQgraphers of America, Amalg.mated (AFL) 
Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood of (Ind,) 
Locomotive Firemen & JngineEen, Brotherhood of (Ind.) 
Longshoremen's Association, International (AFL) 
Machinist.a,, International Association of ( AFL) 
Main~enance ot way Employees, Bro~herbood ot (AFL) 
Marine Engineers• Beneficial Asaocia~ion, Na~ional Union 
ot ( CIO) 
Mari~ime Union ot ~erica, Na~ional {CIO) 
uas~ers, Ma~es & Pilo~a ot America fAlL) 
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Mea~ cu~~ers & Bu~cher workmen or Nor~h America, Amal~ama~ed 
(AFL) 
Mine Workers ot America, Progressive (AFL) 
Mine Workers of America, tJni~ed (Ind.) 
Mine, Mill & Smel~er Workers, In~ernational Union of (CIO) 
Molders & Foundry Workers Union of Nor~h America, In~er-
naiional (AFL) 
Musicians, Americam Federa~ion of (AFL) 
Hewapapar Guild, American (CIO) 
Office Employes Interna~ional Union (AlL) 
Oil, Chemical & A~omic workers In~~rna~ional Union (CIO) 
Packinshouae Workers ot America, United (CIO) 
Pain~ers, Decorators & Paperhangers ot America, Bro~herhood 
of (AFL) 
Paper Makers, In~erna~ional Bro~herbood of (AFL) 
Pa~~ern Makers• League of Nor~b ~erica (AFL) 
Pho~o-Engravers• Union of North America, In~erna~ional (AFL) 
Plas~erera• and Cemen~ Masons• Inter~a~ional Association of 
The Uni~ed S~a~ea and Canada, Opera~ive (AFL) 
Post Office Clerksm Na~ional Federa~ion of (AFL) 
Pos~al Transport Association, Na~ional (AFL) 
Po~ters, National Bro~herhood of Opera~ive (AFL) 
Prin~ing Preaemen•e & Asaie~an\a• Union of North America, 
Interna~ional (AFL) 
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Pulp, Sulphi~e & Paper Mill workers of the u. ~. and canada, 
Interna~ional Bro~herhood ot (AFL) 
Railroad Trainmen, Brotherhood of (Ind.) 
Railway Carmen of America, Brotherhood of (AFL) 
Railway Conduct ore of America, Order of (Ind.) 
Railway & Steamship Clerks, Freigh~ Handlers, Express & 
Station Employes, Brotherhood of (AFL) 
Retail Clerks Interna~ional Protective Associa~ion (AFL) 
Rubber Workers• of America, United (CIO) 
Seatarere• International Union of North America (AFL) 
Sleeping var Portera, Brotherhood of (AFLJ 
Stage Baployees & ~oving Picture Machine Operators Qf the 
u. s. and Canada, International Alliance of 
Theatrical (AFL) 
state, county & Municipal Eaployeee, American Federation of 
(AFL) 
Steelworkers of America, United (CIO) 
Stereotypers• & Electrotypers Union of North Alllerica, rnter-
na~ional (AFL) 
S~one & Allied Products Workers of America, United (~IO) 
stove koan~er•• International Union cf North America (AFL) 
S~reet, ~lectric Railway & Motor ~oach Employees of America, 
Amalgamated Associa~ion ot (AFL) 
Teachers, American Federation ot (AFL) 
Teamst.ers, ~flears, Warehou•emen & Helpers of America, 
International Broth~rhood ot (AF.L) 
Telegraphers union ot North Allerica, commercial (AFL) 
Textile workers union ot America (CIO) 
Tobacco Workers• International union (AFL) 
Transport Service Elllployees ot America, United ( CIO) 
Transport Workers Union ot ~erica (CIO) 
b'JOgraphical Union, Inte1·nat1oa~l (AFL) 
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Upholsterers• International Union ot North America (AlL) 
Utility workers Organi&in&, · C.~i ttee (CIO) 
Woodworkers ot America, International (CIO) 
Table V 
Unions Refusing to Send Financial Reports# 
Actor!:! &Artistes of America, The Associated (AFL) 
Agricultural \Vp.rkers Union, National (CIO) 
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Barbers, Hairdressers &. Cosmetologists' .International Union 
of America, The Journeymen (AFL) 
Brewers, Flour, Cereal & Soft Drink Workers of America, 
Int. Union of America (CIO) 
Blacksmiths, Drop Forgers & Helpers, International Brother-
hood of (AFL) 
Brick & Clay •Yorkers of Anerica, The United (AFL) 
Cleaning & Dye House Workers, International Association of 
(AFL) 
Distillery, Rectifying & Wine Workers' Intertational Union 
of America (AFL) 
Dyers, Finishers, Printers & Bleachers of America, Federa-
tion of ( CIO) 
Elevator Constructors, International Union of (AFL) 
Farm Equipment & Metal Workers of Americam United (CIO) 
Federal Employees, National Federation of (Ind.) 
Federal Workers of America, United (CIO) 
Firemen & Oilers, International Brotherhood of (AFL) 
Fishermen & Allied Workers of America, International (CIO) 
Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of 
America (CIO) 
Fur & Leather Workers' Union, International (CIO) 
Garment workers of America, United (AFL) 
Government Employees, American Federation of (AFL) 
Grain Millers, American Federation of (AFL) 
Industrial Trades Union of America (Ind.) 
#This list incluttes all unions which either refused to 
send me their Financial reports or did not answer my 
letters requesting such reports. 
Insurance Agents• International Union (AlL) 
Jewelry Workers•union, International (AFL) 
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Marble, Slat~ & Stone Polishers, RUbbeN& Sawyers, Tile & 
Marble Setters Helpvrs & Terrazzo Helpers, Inter-
national Associatio~ of (AlL) 
Marine Cooks & Stewards Association of the Pacific Coast (CIO) 
Marine Firemen, Oilera, watertendera & Wipers of the Pacific 
Coast (Ind.) 
Metal Polishera, Buffera, Platera & Helpers Internat1ona1 
Union (AFL) 
Office & Professional Workers of ~erica, onitea (CIO) 
Optical & Instrument Workers of ~erica, United (CIO) 
Paper Workers of ~~rica, united (CIO) 
Playthings, Je~elry & Novelty Workers International Union (CIO) 
Pl-'llera 1: Steam Fi ttera of the U. s. & Canaua, United 
Association of (CIO) 
Post Office Cl~rka, United National Association of (Ind.) 
Postal Employees, National Alliance of (Ind.) 
Postal Sup~rvisors, The National Association O• (Ind.) 
Postmaaters of .. he u. s., National League of Dislorlct (Ind.) 
Public Wotkers of Alllerica, United (CIO) 
Railroad Signalmen, Brotherhood of (Ind.) 
Railroad Telegraphers, Order of (AFL) 
Railway Mail Association (AFL) 
Retail, Whoaesale & Department Store Eaployees of America, 
United (CIO) 
Sheet Me~al workers' International Association (AFL) 
Shoe Workers of Alllerica, united (CIO) 
State, Coun~y & Municipal Workers of Ameri~a (CIO) 
Sw1 t.cblllen I" Union of Hoi't.h:·.JIU!'iCllc (AJ'L)- . : c'\ 
Telephone workers, Nat.ional Federat.ion of (Ind.) 
Text.ile Workers of Aaerica, Unit.ed (CIO) 
Tool and Dye Craft.amen, t.he Societ.y of (Ind.) 
Ut.ili~ies union of America, Unit.ed (Ind.) 
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Table VI 
Inveauaent Portfolio 
Internatiopal Brotherhood of OPerative Pottera 
u. S. Government Bonde 
Checking Account 
Savinga Ac;count 
Stocks 
Stocks 
Shares 
1 ~:. c:.- Insurance Caapaniea 
$503,000 
227,917 
227,284 
4,001,16'1 
1000 
.1000 
Aetna Insurance Caapany 
American Auto Insurance Company 
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1000 
2500 
600 
500 
1000 
American Equitable Assurance Company of New York 
American Insurance Company of New Jersey 
American Sure\y Caapany of New York 
'1'00 
1650 
1ZOO 
1500 
1000 
2000 
1000 
1800 
1000 
1719 
1&20 
'1'00 
1680 
1500 
1000 
1'1'00 
1000 
1000 
ll"T4 
1000 
1000 
401'1' 
1500 
500 
4172 
camden Fire Insurance Association 
i*p1oyers Group Association 
Firemen's Fuud Inaurance compa11y 
General Reinaurance Corpora~ion 
Hanover Fire Ina•rance Company 
Home Insurance Co.mpany 
Jersey Inaurance Co~pany 
Jaaeacbuaetts Bonding & Insurance Company 
Merchants & Manufacturers Insurance Company 
National Union Fire Insucanc~ Company 
New Aasterdam casualty Company 
New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. 
Northern Insurance Company 
North River Insurance Co~pany 
Pacific Indemnity Company 
Peerleos casualty Company 
Pennsylvania Caapany for Insurance 
Providence Washington Insurance Company 
Springfield Fire & Marina Insurance company 
Standard Accident Insurance Compauy 
union Labor Life Insurance Company 
Westchester Fire Insutanee Company 
J?anka 
American True~ Company 
!lank of Alllerica 
·. pankera Ti'ue.t' c,pmpany 
California Bank 
Central National Bank of Cleveland 
1500 
81!'5 
500 
1000 
2000 
1000 
2000 
3000 
1000 
772 
1500 
575 
1000 
1000 
1000 
:5000 
1060 
1000 
1000 
3000 
500 
$500 
2000 
6000 
2000 
1500 
250 
100 
1000 
3000 
1000 
1000 
2000 
1000 
$000 
2000 
2201 
2250 
1500 
2200 
1590 
1210 
1815 
1371 
400 
2785 
-1100 
1000 
Chaae Nat.ional_ Bank 
Chemical Bank &: True. Company 
Fl.deli t.y Philadelphia Trust co. 
Firat National Bank of Atlant.a 
Firat. National Bank of PhilaCelphia 
Guarant.y Trust. Company of Hew York 
Irving Trust. Company 
Nat.ional Bank of Dover 
Nat.ional Shawmut. Bank of Boaton 
PeDDayl v_IJ;IiA J;.aapany for Bank1 p,g 
i - r.; ll?&opt.!a SJ.aat.,_Naioiba.a1 aank:,l:cTrus~.C;capany 
Pn·u~ Hat.i onal Bank of Mew York City 
Republic •at.ional Bank of Dallas 
Union sank of Commerce 
PUblic Ut.ility Caapanies 
~erican Wat.er Works, $1.50 preferred 
Arizona Public Service COIIIP&DJ"" 
Black Hills Powert,.~o Light. Company 
California Oregon Power Company 
Cent.ral Illinois Public Service Company 
c.nt.ral Indiana Gas C;apany 
Cent.ral Maine Power C011pany, 3~ preferred 
Celtl8~S aad Southern Ohio Elect.ric company 
llqlll t&1ile Gas C011pany 
General Public Service Corporation 
General Te.lephome COIIipany of Ohio 
General :n4liephQne cc:apany of the South west 
Ceae.ral 'Telephone corporat.i on 
Illinois Power Co. 
Indiana Gas a: Wat.er Company 
Interst.ate Power co. 
Iowa Elect.ric Light &: Power Company 
Iowa Power &: Ligh~ Company 
Iowa Sout.hern Otili~ies 
·_. nptucky: OtilU.ie!l -CJi!Epany 
!ilj,ddle South Utili ties, Incorporated 
Minnesota Power & Light Company 
New England Gas &: Electric Association 
New York State Electric &: Gaa Corporation 
Niagara Mohawk Power Company 
Nort.hern Indiana Public Service Company 
Northwest. Public Company 
Ohio :s.tl,•on Company_, :: 'j 
Oklahoae. 0... &: Electric Company 
Pacitic Gaa & Electric Campany 
Pacific Gas &: Electric co. 
Pacific Power & Light. Company 
Public Service Company of Indiana, Incorpora~ed 
Public Service Gas &: Elec,ric Compamy 
110 
1500 
lOiS 
1000 
. 1608 
1220 
200 
1530 
3000 
300 
1500 
1000 
550 
1000 
750 
2050 
1000 
.2500 
175 
850 
puilic Service of New Hampshire 
tRoches~er Gas & Elec~ric Corporation 
epu~hern California Edison company 
Southwestern Public Service Company 
Tennessee Gas Transmission Company 
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation 
Texas Gas Transmission Corporation 
Texas U~ilities Company 
Toledo Edison Company, 4.56~ preferred 
Transcontinen~al Gas Pipe Line Corporation 
Tucson Gas, Elec~ric Light & Power Company 
Utah Power & Ugh l. company 
Vermon~ Public Service Caapany 
others 
Clevite Corporation 
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Fanner Manufacturing Company 
Foote Bro~hers Gear & Machine Corp., 5 3/4~ preferred 
General Con~ract Corporation, 6~ preferred 
Harshaw Chemical Corporation, 4tfo Preferred 
Twin Coach, $1.50 Preferred 
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